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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three chapters. The first chapter - “Modelling Weights and
Dependence Parameters in Mixed Copulas using Penalized Likelihood - Various Ap-
plications”, relates to modelling of the weights and dependence parameters of copulas
and using data driven copula selection methods to select the correct copula structure
underlying the data. The first part of the paper uses a parametric weight specification
to model the dependence parameters, as a regression equation of exogenous variables.
The model is simulated using a modified EM algorithm and the non-linear dependence
structure is studied in a relatively new area namely the offshore exchange markets in
India. In the second application with parametric weights, the dependence structure
in US housing markets is studied. Results show that while the Gaussian copula is
enough to characterize the dependence structure in offshore markets in India, housing
markets in New York and Kansas exhibit negative dependence. The second part of the
paper designates weights as non-parametric (unknown) functions of structural vari-
ables leading to functional index coefficient model structure coupled with selection of
mixed copula. The model has been simulated and applied to measure the dependence
structure of money markets in Denmark which have recently taken to negative interest
rates. Results show that the shares of normal and frank copulas have been steadily
declining while the share of copulas with extreme dependence has been rising with
a prominent rise of clayton copula in the bivariate distribution of short and long run
interest rates post financial crisis.
The second chapter of the dissertation - “Asset Price Volatility and Optimal Policy
iii
Mix in Overlapping Generations Model”, revisits a perennially unresolved issue – the
question of central bank intervention in managing asset bubbles through the Taylor
rule or through (calibrated or un-calibrated) macroprudential policy intervention in
credit disbursement. The chapter lays down the theoretical foundations of macropru-
dential policies like capital adequacy by extending Gali (2014) overlapping genera-
tions economy with credit frictions. While the results of the model with financial
frictions vindicate Gali (2014) that a leaning against the wind monetary policy gen-
erates a larger volatility in the bubble than a policy of benign neglect, the paper finds
that minimisation of bubble volatility requires an active macro-prudential policy. It
is also observed that stronger interest rate response of monetary policy to the bubble
necessitates a stronger macroprudential response possibly to absorb the excess volatil-
ity generated by the monetary policy. However, the paper also finds that tightening
macroprudential policy parameter beyond a threshold value may encourage banks to
take more risks and increase credit supply, aggravating the bubble in the process. With
respect to macroprudential policy, there is no conflict between stabilization of current
aggregate demand and stabilization of future aggregate demand and both call for a
strong macroprudential response, at least until the macroprudential parameter attains
the threshold value, although the conflict between the two objectives persists with re-
spect to monetary policy as in Gali (2014).
The second paper has been empirically verified through a vector autoregression with
sign restrictions approach of (i) Mountford and Uhlig (2005) penalty function ap-
proach (PFA); and (ii) Andrew Binning’s underidentified SVAR approach. Using
US data, this paper finds that provisioning shock in general and dynamic loan loss
provisioning shock, in particular reduces stock prices and dampens output growth as
opposed to monetary policy. This result is substantiated both under recursive SVAR
specifications as well as sign restrictions imposed according to Mountford and Uhlig
iv
(2005) specification. However, by combining sign and zero restrictions in an under-
identified SVAR model proposed by Binning(2013),the paper finds that stock prices
decline when variables are assumed to be responding to provisions shock only in the
long run and the provisions shock is exactly identified. However, when sign restric-
tions are imposed on inflation, impact response of stock price to provisions shock as
well as monetary policy shock is ambiguous. However, stock prices decline during the
second quarter in response to a provisions shock.
Chapter 3 - “Financial Inclusion, Financial Stability and Credit Cycles in EMEs” ex-
amines the role of monetary and macroprudential policy in enhancing financial stabil-
ity in the backdrop of bank-based financial inclusion in emerging market economies
like India. A new Keynesian DSGE model of heterogeneous households characterised
by various financial frictions typical of an economy adopting bank-based financial in-
clusion measures is constructed. Results from the DSGE model show that increased
financial inclusion may accelerate credit flow to all sectors and raise output if the
banking correspondent agents serve as business facilitators involved through the life
cycle of the loan and not merely intermediaries involved in cash in and cash out type
of transactions. The non-performing asset to gross loan ratio declines indicating the
model promotes financial stability. The result confirms how appropriate involvement
of BCAs can attenuate the problem of adverse selection for the bank raising over-
all credit supply in the economy. With respect to standard shocks, financial inclu-
sion seems to delay the impact of monetary tightening, while contractionary macro-
prudential shocks have the desired impact but lead to a net transfer of wealth from
impatient borrowers to entrepreneurs. Using data from 29 countries spanning Asia,
Africa, Latin America and peripheral Europe and twin methods - (i) cointegration and
VECM techniques and (ii) VAR with long run restrictions using instrumental variables,
the paper also investigated the long run relationship between financial inclusion and
v
financial and banking stability and the significance of permanent shocks to financial
inclusion. The cointegration analysis confirms the presence of a common stochastic
trend running through credit to domestic sectors, non-performing loans (NPLs) as a
proportion of total loans and bank regulatory provisions as a per centage of total assets
in 24 of the 29 countries surveyed. In 14 of the 24 countries, there is clear evidence
of a permanent decline in NPLs following an inclusion shock. All sample countries
that implement bank based financial inclusion exhibit this trend with the exception
of Turkey and Peru. The VAR analysis with long run restrictions does not confirm
a statistically significant reduction of NPLs following a permanent shock to financial
inclusion. However, crucial evidence is found confirming the reduction in NPLs in
the long run following a positive productivity shock and a rise in credit following a
permanent financial inclusion shock.
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Chapter 1
Modelling Weights and Dependence Parameters in Mixed
Copulas using Penalized Likelihood - Various Applications
1.1 Introduction
Copula applications are well documented in the financial literature. Deviation from normality
is a common phenomenon in financial time series and hence Pearson’s correlation and concepts
based on linearity may not be able to completely characterize the dependence in non elliptical dis-
tributions. Embrechts et al (2002) illustrates that a dependence measure like linear correlation may
not be a perfect measure of dependence because it fulfils only two desired properties of an ideal
dependence measure viz., symmetry and normalisation but falls short of other properties such as
comonotonic and countermonotonic.
However, a major question that confronts researchers in most copula applications is how to
choose the correct functional form of copula. In the extant literature, the choice of copula func-
tional form is decided based on certain goodness of fit tests such as Kolmogorov Smirnov and
Anderson and Darling type tests developed by Kole,Koedjik and Verbeek (2007), kernel-based
tests of Scalliet(2007)and omnibus tests of Genest, Remillard and Beaudoin (2009). However, this
literature could not resolve the issues as to which copula model should be used if the null hypoth-
esis is rejected in these tests (Cai and Wang (2014)). In contrast, Cai and Wang (2014) provide a
theoretical foundation for a data driven mixed copula selection method using penalized likelihood
plus a shrinkage operator in the spirit of LASSO. Empirically a mixed copula can provide flexibil-
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ity in modelling and describing dependence structure. Further, Cai and Wang’s approach enables
simultaneous copula selection and estimation of dependence parameters.
It is also realized that in their present form, copulas have limited use in economic policy infer-
ence because of interpretability issues with the dependence parameter. Copula dependence is not
as intuitive as the linear correlation coefficient limiting their use in economic policy inference. In
this paper, constructing on the method proposed by Cai and Wang(2014), I model the weights and
dependence parameter of copulas, (a) first as a parametric regression function of various macroe-
conomic variables and (b) as an unknown non-parametric function of structural variables using
functional index coefficient models. The coefficients of the regression model will be more easily
and intuitively interpretable than the copula dependence parameter itself. Thus along with simul-
taneous copula selection and estimation, this model will also be easy with interpretation. This
paper is not the first of its kind. Patton (2006) had earlier attempted to model the dependence
parameter in gaussian copulas but he did not use selection approach and restricted his analysis to
gaussian and joe-clayton copula. In terms of applications, I apply copulas to model the bivariate
conditional joint distribution in three relatively new areas. We undertake detailed simulations of
the two models in section. In section, we attempt several empirical applications. In the paramet-
rics case, our first application is in onshore and non deliverable forward exchange rate market for
Indian Rupee(INR) for pre and post crisis periods. Post global financial crisis and with increasing
debates about currency internationalisation of EME currencies like the Chinese renminbi and In-
dian rupee,there is an increasing interest in developing country policy circles to enhance the use
of the currency outside the economy. But it is equally concerning, that the spotlight on offshore
forex markets has tightened in almost all developing economies with capital controls because of
rapid volatility movements in the spot exchange rate markets, particularly during periods of de-
preciation. Of late, there is news of volatility spillovers from offshore market to the spot market
motivating us to study the non-linear dependence structure in these markets. My second applica-
tion with parametric weights is based on US housing market inspired by the work of Fairchild, Ma
and Wu (2014). In my third application with non-parametric weights, I examine the money market
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integration in the Euro area, particularly in areas which have implemented negative interest rates
in the last few years.
The paper is organised in the following order. Section II discusses some dependence concepts.
Section III reviews the literature on copulas. Section IV elaborates on the theory behind selec-
tion of mixed copulas using penalized likelihood while Section V talks about various estimation
procedures. Section VI details the simulations results while Section VII elaborates on the three
empirical applications. Section VIII elaborates the estimation of the model with non-parametric
weights.
1.2 Some Dependence Concepts
“A multivariate model should be analysed for the types of dependence structure that it covers
as well as range of dependence. The dependence properties are important in order to know if a
particular model might be suitable for a given application or a dataset” - (Joe,1997). The math-
ematical concept of dependence is much broader and more sophisticated than that considered in
economic contexts. The dependence between two non-normal random variables cannot be sum-
marized with general association measures like the Pearson’s linear correlation coefficient. An
exhaustive summary of various dependence concepts used in literature is described in Joe (1997)
and Nelson (2006). Below, I describe some directly relevant dependence concepts to facilitate the
study.
1.2.1 Positive Quadrant Dependence
Definition: (Joe;1997): If X = (X1,X2) is a bivariate random vector with cumulative distribu-
tion function F, then F is positive quadrant dependent if




Pr(X1 ≤ a1,X2 ≤ a2)≥ Pr(X1 ≤ a1)Pr(X2 ≤ a2)
In other words, X1 and X2 are more likely to be large or small together than X ′1 and X
′
2 as com-
pared with a vector of independent random variables with same corresponding univariate margins
(Joe, 1997).
1.2.2 Stochastic Increasing Positive Dependence
If X = (X1,X2) is a bivariate random vector with cumulative distribution function F ∈ (F1,F2),
then the conditional distribution F2|1 is stochastically increasing if
Pr(X1 > a1|X2 = x1) = 1−F2|1(x1|x2) ↑ x1∀x2
1.2.3 Right Tail Increasing and Left Tail Decreasing
Let X = (X1,X2) be a bivariate random vector with cdf F ∈ F(F1,F2). X2 is right tail increasing
in X1 if
Pr(X2 > x2|X1 > x1) = F̄(x1,x2)/F̄1(x1) ↑ x1 ∀x2
X2 is left-tail decreasing in X1 if
Pr(X2 ≤ x2|X1 ≤ x1) = F(x1,x2)/F1(x1) ↓ x1 ∀x2
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1.2.4 Associated Random Variables
Let X be a random p-vector. X is positively associated if the inequality
E[g1(X)g2(X)]≥ E[g1(X)]E[g2(X)]
holds for all real valued functions g1 and g2 which are increasing in each component. A positive
dependence condition for X implies that two increasing functions of X have positive covariance
whenever the covariance exists.
1.3 Definition and Related Literature
Many papers and text books have described copula as a link function that ’joins or couples
multivariate distribution functions to their one dimensional marginal distribution functions’ (Nel-
son(2006)). But Nelson(2006) provides a more in-depth definition of copulas.
Definition1: (Adapted from Nelson(2006)) Suppose X and Y is a pair of random variables
with distribution function F(x) = P(X ≤ x) and G(y) = P(Y ≤ y) and a joint distribution function
H(x.y) = P(X ≤ xY ≤ y). So each pair of real numbers (x,y) leads to a point (F(x),G(y)) in the unit
square [0,1]X[0,1] and this ordered pair corresponds to a number H(x,y) in [0,1]. Thus a copula is
a correspondence which assigns a value of joint distribution function to each ordered pair of values
of individual distribution function.
Thus bivariate/multivariate distribution modelling with copulas involves two key stages: Iden-
tifying the marginal distribution of the univariate series and then identifying the copula. Copula
literature is replete with parametric and non parametric methods to model marginal distributions
and copulas. A key issue in applying copulas to practical applications is to choose the correct
parametric copula because we have no prior knowledge of the distribution from which the data is
drawn. Further different copula families contribute differently towards dependence. Thus while
the gaussian copula is symmetric with no tail dependence, clayton and gumbel copula have nega-
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tive and positive dependence, respectively. For a proper evaluation of the multivariate density, we
need to give due weights to different dependence structures, probably data driven weights. Hence
it is legitimate to consider a mixed copula which warrants different weights to different copulas.
A key method used in selecting the component copulas in mixed copula analysis is the penalized
log likelihood method. In an empirical analysis, Hu(2006) considered a mixed copula by deleting
the component if corresponding weight is lower than 0.1 or if the corresponding dependence mea-
sure is close to independence. Cai and Wang(2014) were the first to develop a data driven copula
selection method via penalized likelihood. Cai and Wang (2014) were of the view that best mixed
copula can be selected by choosing the one with highest likelihood. The idea is to fit a copula and
drop all the component copulas with very small weights which indicate very small contribution to
dependence.
1.4 Theory
Let (Xt)Tt=1 be independent p-dimensional vectors of random variables with Xt =(Xt1,Xt2, .......Xt p)
T .
Let F(x) and f(x) be the distribution and joint density of X, respectively. Also let f j and Fj(X j)
be the marginal density and distribution of X j, respectively for 1 ≤ j ≤ p. Cai and Wang (2014)
define a mixed copula as a linear combination of several copula families represented as





where C1(.)......Cs(.) is a set of basis copulas which is a sequence of known parametric cop-
ulas with unknown dependence parameters θk. [λk]sk=1 are the weights satisfying 0 ≤ λk ≤ 1 and
∑k=1λk = 1 also called a shape parameters. And α = (α1,α2......αp) is the vector of marginal
parameters for marginal distributions. Let φ = (αT ,λ T ,θ T )T be the vector of all parameters in-
volved.













du is the mixed partial derivative of the copula C(.) and we assume
these copula densities exist as in Cai and Wang (2014). With iid data, the penalized log likelihood


























I propose to expand this concept by modelling the weights and dependence parameters of the
copulas so as to provide more economic content to the whole idea. I concentrate on the bivariate
copulas because it is analytically tractable and graphically explainable.
1.4.1 Modelling Copula Dependence Parameters as Regression Equation:
To begin with, lets start by expressing the dependence parameters in the regression framework.
I regress the dependence parameters on a k-dimensional vector
ZT = (Z1,Z2....Zk) of macro-variables or simply the trend. The dependence parameters are
modelled as a function of these exogenous variables
θi,t = θ(β ′ZT )
where θ is a known link function particular to the copula in question to ensure that the copula









1.4.2 Modelling Weights and Dependence
Like the dependence parameter, the weights could also be subject to exogenous shocks. For
example, it is interesting to see how the weights on copulas of term structure of interest rates vary
with exogenous monetary policy shock. In other words,
λk,t = λ (β ′ZT )
where k∈[Ga,Cl,Fr,Gu], where Ga refers to Gaussian copula, Cl refers to Clayton copula, Fr
refers to Frank copula and Gu refers to Gumbel copula.





λk(κ ′ZT )Ck(F1(x1;α1),F2(x2;α2);θk(β ′ZT ))
We begin our analysis in an exploratory mode and start with generic penalty functions such as
L2 regularization p(λk) = (∑sk=1λ
2
k )
1/2. We then build on the structure emerging from the results
with more sophisticated penalty functions such as smoothly clipped absolute deviation penalties
(SCAD) as used in Cai and Wang (2014).
1.5 Estimation
The two established methods for estimation of copula models in the literature are the (i) Exact
Maximum Likelihood Method and (ii)Inference of Margins Method (IFM). In the Exact Maximum
Likelihood Method, marginal parameters and the copula parameters are estimated simultaneously













ln( f j(x jt)
where φ is the set of all marginal and copula parameters. Under regularity conditions, the
maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) exists and it is consistent and asymptotically efficient. Also
it is asymptotically normal
√
T (φ̂ −φ0)→ N(0,Γ−1(φ0)
where Γ(φ0) is the Fisher’s Information matrix and φ0 is the true value (Cherubini et al, 2004).
On the other hand, the alternative method, IFM method, is based on the inference function the-
ory as proposed by Joe and Xu (1996). In this method, instead of maximising the multivariate
log-likelihood in all the parameters together, one can estimate different parameters of different
marginal distributions of the multivariate distribution. The inference functions are score functions
of likelihoods of marginal distributions. The first step involves estimation of the maximum likeli-
hood estimate of the marginal parameters, α̂ j such that







ln( f j(x jt ;α j)






The IFM estimator also satisfies the property of asymptotic normality
√
T ( ˆφIFM−φ0)→N(0,G−1(φ0))
where G(θ0) is the Godambe Information matrix.
Cai and Wang (2014) use a full maximum likelihood approach to estimate the copula param-
eters in an iterative algorithm. This is a two step expectation-maximization algorithm where in
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the E-step estimates the conditional probability of the observations coming from each component
copula and the M-step estimates the dependence parameters. As in Cai and Wang (2014), we have
the joint density function
F(x,φ) = λGaCGa(F1,F2;θGa)+λClCCl(F1,F2;θCl)+
λFCF(F1,F2;θF)+λGuCGu((F1,F2;θGu) (1.2)
where CCl = [max(u−θCl +v−θCl−1,0)]−1/θCl is the CDF of the Clayton copula where θClε[1,∞)/0
is the dependence parameter.
CF =− 1θF ln(1+
(e−θF u−1)∗(e−θF v−1)
e−θF−1 ) is the CDF of the Frank parameter where θF∈(−∞,∞) is
the dependence parameter.
CGu = exp((−1)∗ [(−ln(u))θGu +(−ln(v))θGu]1/θGu is the CDF of the Gumbel parameter where
θGu∈[1,∞)
However, we add to Cai and Wang (2014) by modelling the weights and dependence parameters
as a regression equation of (a) exogenous processes Zt and (b)trend
λk = λ (β ′ZT )
θk = θ(β ′ZT )
where λ and θ are known link functions particular to the copula in question to ensure that the
copula parameter and weights stays in the required range. We choose the link functions keeping in
mind the domains of the dependence parameter such that θGa = 1−exp(−γ ∗z+ε1)/(1+exp(−γ ∗
z+ ε1)) remains in the domain (-1,1) (Patton, 2006). Similarly, the dependence parameter for
Clayton was (1+ exp(γ∗z+ε2)1+exp(γ∗z+ε2)) so as to keep the parameter within the domain of [1,∞) and the
parameter for Frank copula was expressed as ( 1(exp(θ∗z+ε3) + exp(θ ∗ z+ ε3))
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The estimation of the regression coefficients on the dependence parameter as well as the
weights amounts to adding an additional block to the existing EM algorithm. The score func-
tion w.r.t regression coefficient on dependence parameter is non linear and hence coefficient is
estimated by applying Newton Raphson methodology. It is easy to see that modelling the weights
by using logit link functions does not alter the nature of the EM algorithm although the weights are
now treated as functions. However, we still need to update the weights by estimating the regres-
sion coefficient. The coefficient is estimated through non linear least squares which is a consistent
estimate.
1.6 Simulations
Simulations are designed as in Cai and Wang (2014). In the first set of simulations, only the
dependence parameter is modelled and not the weights. Simulated examples are constructed con-
sisting of single copulas as well as mixed copulas. As in Cai and Wang(2014), a data generating
process where the bivariate joint distribution has a form of copula function and individual variables
are normally distributed is used. The marginal distributions are distributed with marginal parame-
ters (µ1,σ1) = (1,0.5) and (µ2,σ2) = (0,2).
Each time data is generated from a single copula for three different sample sizes, N=400,700
and 1000 which implies that weight corresponding to that particular copula is 1 and the weight
corresponding to other copulas is zero. Then the penalized maximum likelihood estimates are
computed. The simulation is run 500 times. The bias and mean squared error is reported in Table
1.1. It may be seen that the bias declines with the increase in sample size. All the estimates are
close to arbitrarily given initial values.
Table 1.2 details the percentages of correctly selected copulas. It may be observed that there
is 100 per cent chance to choose the correct single copula when the underlying copula in the pop-
ulation is either Frank, Clayton or Gumbel. However, we encounter a problem similar to Cai and
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Table 1.1: Biases and MSEs of Copula Weights Estimates
from the Simulation Exercise
Clayton Frank Gaussian Gumbel
N
400 Bias -0.0325 -0.092 -0.966 -0.487
MSE 0.011 0.000 0.935 0.001
700 Bias -0.0063 -0.00013 -0.927 -0.392
MSE 0.000 0.000 0.859 0.0007
1000 Bias -0.0052 -0.00011 -0.953 -0.269
MSE 0.0000012 0.000 0.00000018 0.000
Wang (2014) but of a larger magnitude as to identification of gaussian copulas in the population.
We find that the proposed method misidentifies gaussian copula as frank copula majority of the
time. Although this may be attributed to the similar structure of the dependence of the two copu-
las, it remains a drawback of the method.
Table 1.3 provides the simulation results with respect to the SCAD penalty. The proposed
method clearly identifies the copula when the underlying copula is either clayton or gumbel. The
identification problem with Frank and Gaussian persists even with SCAD penalty. However, the
problem seems to be declining with the sample size.
1.7 Empirical Application
i) Housing Prices
Fairchild, Ma and Wu (2014) decomposed price-rent ratios of 23 major housing markets in the
US into national and independent local factors using a dynamic factor model. The paper finds that
a large fraction of housing market volatility is local and that the national factor has become more
important than local factors in driving housing market volatility since 1999. If common under-
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Table 1.2: Percentage that the Corresponding Copula
was selected Correctly (Incorrectly) in the Simulations
N Clayton Gaussian Frank Gumbel
Clayton 400 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
700 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1000 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Gaussian 400 0.00 (1.00) 0.00 0.00
700 0.00 (1.00) 0.00 0.00
1000 0.00 (1.00) 0.00 0.00
Frank 400 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
700 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
1000 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
Gumbel 400 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
700 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
1000 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Table 1.3: Biases and MSEs of Copula Weights Estimates
from the Simulation Exercise (with SCAD penalty)
Clayton Frank Gaussian Gumbel
N
400 Bias 0.001 0.665 -0.897 0.001
MSE 0.000 0.161 0.000 0.001
700 Bias 0.014 -0.482 -0.618 -0.000
MSE 0.000 0.236 0.000 0.000
1000 Bias 0.001 0.093 -0.789 0.000
MSE 0.000 0.034 0.000 0.000
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Table 1.4: Weights and Regression Coefficient Estimates in US Housing Markets
Clayton Frank Gaussian Gumbel
Weights 0.84 0.181 0.0005 0
Coefficient on National Factor 2.16 0.5 - 0
Coefficient on Local Factors 0.31 0.5 - 0
lying factors is affecting the US housing market, it should be reflected in the correlation across
these markets. This empirical example applies the above method to test how the copula depen-
dence parameter relates to these unobserved factors underlying housing markets across time. So
like Fairchild, Ma and Wu (2014), a dynamic factor model is used to segregate the various national
and local factors that regulate the movement of housing prices in US first and then the copula
dependence parameters are regressed on those factors through the proposed algorithmic model.
Quarterly data on 10 housing price indices provided by the Federal Housing Finance Agency is
used to estimate the factors underlying these markets for the period 1991Q1:2014Q4. The copula
dependence parameters is then regressed on these factors to assess the non linear dependence be-
tween New York and Kansas housing markets which share a linear correlation coefficient of 0.28
during the period under review. The clayton dependence parameter, for instance, is now mod-
elled as θcl = 1+ plogis(η1 ∗ flocal +η2 ∗ fnational + εt), with the notations having their respective
meanings.
The results in Table 1.4 show that the dependence pattern between these two markets is largely
negative with the clayton copula bearing a weight of 0.84 in the algorithm and gaussian copula
having a weight of 0.18. So this implies that these markets move together during downturns. As
may be seen from the corresponding figure 1.1 which displays the time varying clayton copula
dependence pattern during 1991Q1:2014Q4, the correlation spiked in the run up to the crisis and
peaked in 2008, while remaining almost dormant for most of the 90s.
ii) Offshore Markets in Indian Rupee
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Figure 1.1: Varying Clayton Dependence
The second empirical application concerns the offshore markets in Indian rupee (INR). Basic
statistical analysis of this market indicates large excess kurtosis of returns, particularly returns in
the NDF market clearly indicate that the empirical distribution of the returns display fatter tails than
the gaussian distribution. This is substantiated by the kernel densities of returns in these markets
in Figures 1.2. It is clear that linear correlation cannot possibly completely define the dependence
structure of these exchange rates.
Using daily data on returns in the offshore markets obtained from the Reuters database, the
dependence parameters and weights on the copulas are modelled as an AR(1) process. The log
difference in INRS pot is denoted as Xt while log difference in INR-NDF 1month is indicated as Yt
As in Patton (2006), both are modelled as GARCH (1,1) with symmetric student t innovations
Xt = µx + εt
σ
2












Yt = µy +ηt
σ
2










The results of the conditional marginal model are appended in Table 1.5 and the results of the
estimation are given in Table 1.6.
The correlation in the INR-Spot and INR-NDF is characterised primarily by gaussian depen-
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Table 1.5: Results of Conditional Garch Models
INR-Spot INR-Spot INR-NDF INR-NDF
Coeff S.E Coeff S.E
Constant 0.012 0.007 0.015 0.009
w(x),w(y) 0.002 0.001 0.01 0.003
b(x),b(y) 0.889 0.02 0.818 0.025
a(x),a(y) 0.125 0.027 0.179 0.031
Shape Par 4.09 0.463 4.38 0.46
dence with the weight on the gaussian copula being 0.7 and that on the frank copula being 0.3
which has a similar dependence structure as gaussian copulas.
1.8 Estimation with Non-Parametric Weights
According to the Sklar’s Theorem, the joint distribution is linearly associated with the compo-
nent copulas which could involve some misspecification error. In this segment, in order to improve
on the specification, the multivariate distribution is expressed as a combination of copulas with
non-linear weights λk(.) where (λk)
p
k=1 are unknown functions






In fact, Equation 1.3 can be treated as a special case of functional index coefficient models of
Fan, Yao and Cai (2003). These models have a long history beginning with Ichimura (1993).
The model bears considerable economic relevance. The structure of bivariate distribution
would be influenced by the structural changes in the economy. One way of depicting this would
be to envisage that the composition of the joint distribution as borne out by the mixture of copulas
with different dependence properties changes in line with the structural changes in the economy.
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Table 1.6: Coefficients on Weights and Dependence Parameters
weights par on dependence par on weights
Gaussian Copula 0.7001 -3.07 1.265
Clayton Copula 0 0 0
Frank Copula 0.299 -39.48 0.6
Gumbel Copula 0 0 0
This is expected to be reflected in the weights of the component copula functions. Hence the
weights on copulas are modelled as unknown functions of structural variables. The ensuing model
leads to a selection of mixed copula via penalized likelihood within the estimation of functional
index coefficient models.
The estimation process involves two stages as demonstrated in Fan, Yao and Cai (2003) and
Cai, Juhl and Yang (2014). One, estimation of function λ j(.) given β and estimation of index
coefficient given λ j(.). The copula selection process is embedded by an optimal choice of penalty
function within this framework. Given β , λ j(.) is first estimated by penalized local least squares
localized around β ′Zt . At the second stage, given λ j(.), a one step estimation scheme is employed
as described in Fan, Yao and Cai (2003) to estimate β . Each of the stages is described below in
detail.
1.8.1 Local Linear Estimation
Given an initial estimator β̂ , such that β̂ −β = Op(1/
√















A local linear estimator is used to estimate the functions λ0(.), ...λp−1(.). This amounts to














with respect to [b j] and [c j] where λ̂ j(z) = b̂ j,
ˆ̇
λ j = ĉ j for j = 0...p−1 and set
θ̂ = (b̂0...b̂p−1, ĉ0...ĉp−1)T
In equation 1.5 above, K(.) is the epanechnikov kernel, K(x) = 3/4(1−x2) if abs(x)≤ 1, Pγn is
the SCAD penalty function and (γ1, ...γn) are the tuning parameters. The SCAD penalty function
enjoys some desirable properties of a good penalty function namely unbiasedness, sparsity and
continuity (Fan and Li, 2001).




(Yt−b j− c j(β ′Zt− z)C j)Kh(β ′Zt− z)w(β ′Zt) = 0
−2∑
t
(Yt−b j− c j(β ′Zt− z)C j)Kh(β ′Zt− z)w(β ′Zt)(β ′Zt− z)C j = 0
The estimated coefficients can then be written as
θ̂ = Σ(z)χT (z)W (z)Y
where χ(z) is an n × 2p matrix with ((C f ,Cc,Cg,Cn)T ,(β ′Zt − z)(C f ,Cc,Cg,Cn)T ), W (z) is
an n × n diagonal matrix with Kh(β ′Zt − z)w(β ′Zt) as its i-th diagonal element and Σ(z) =
[χ ′(z)W (z)χ(z)]−1 and Y = (Y1, ...Yn).
1.8.2 Search for Index Coefficient
Given the estimator of λ̂ j(.), β is searched for by minimizing the global least squares
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′Zt)Ck(F1(x1;α1), ...Fn(xn;αn);θk)]2w(β ′Zt) (1.6)
Unlike Cai, Juhl and Yang (2014), the least squares is not penalized to choose locally significant
variables. Instead, the choice of variables is left to economic intuition. The one-step estimation
procedure is used to estimate β just like Newton Raphson estimation.
β
(1) = β (0)−V̈ ((β )(0))−1V̇ (β )(0) (1.7)
The first and second derivatives of V (β ) can be calculated as


























′Zt) ˙λk(β ′Zt)Zt)] (1.8)
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1.8.3 Penalty Function
The SCAD penalty function proposed by Fan and Li (2001) is used which satisfies all the three
desired properties of a good penalty function.
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1.8.4 Choosing Bandwidth and Tuning Parameters
The process described in Cai, Juhl and Yang (2014) is followed for choosing the regularization
parameters - bandwidth h for non-parametric estimator and tuning parameters for penalty terms.
They are chosen simultaneously with BIC-type criterion given as
BIC(h,γ) = log(SSE(h,γ))+d f (h,γ)log(n)/n
where SSE(h,γ) is the sum of squared errors from the penalized least squares estimation and
d f (h,γ) is the number of non-zero beta coefficients conditional on h and γ . Since it is computa-
tionally exhorbitant to choose p-dimensional tuning parameters, the idea in Fan and Li(2004) is
adopted to reduce the dimension of tuning parameters. So let γn = γ0σ̂(β̂ 0k ), where σ̂(β̂
0
k is the
standard deviation of the unpenalized index coefficient.
1.9 Simulations
The data generating process consists of a bivariate distribution which has the form of copula
viz., (ut ,vt) i.i.d C(u,v;θ). The marginal distributions are empirically distributed. The working
mixed copula model is written as
F(x;θ ,λ ) = λg(β ′Zt)Cg(F1(x1), ...Fn(xn);θg)+λ f (β ′Zt)C f (F1(x1), ...Fn(xn);θ f )+
λgu(β
′Zt)Cgu(F1(x1), ...Fn(xn);θgu)+λ f (β ′Zt)Ccl(F1(x1), ...Fn(xn);θcl) (1.10)
Data are generated from the four single copulas, Gaussian (g). Frank (f), Gumbel (gu) and
Clayton (cl). Thus the weight corresponding to the copula in the actual model is 1 as opposed to
the working model. 500 simulations are conducted each for sample sizes of 200, 400 and 1000 and
varying coefficients are computed following the above mentioned DGP and the algorithm elabo-
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Table 1.7: Simulation Results - Non-parametric Weights
n=200 n=400 n=1000
Shrinking Rate Keeping Rate Shrinking Rate Keeping Rate Shrinking Rate Keeping Rate
Gaussian 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Frank 90.20% 90.20% 91.4% 95.50% 91.4% 96.20%
Gumbel 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Clayton 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
rated above. The simulation results demonstrate the shrinkage rate and keeping rate of functional
coefficients. The shrinkage rate may be defined as the percentage that the three functional coeffi-
cients correctly shrink to zero. The keeping rate may be defined as the per centage that the only
non-zero coefficient does not shrink to zero.
1.10 Empirical Application
In another exemplary demonstration of unconventional monetary policy (UMP), five countries
spread over Europe, Scandinavia and Japan introduced negative policy interest rates in the last few
years. Among several aspects, transmission of negative policy rates to other rates in the money
market post the shift in monetary policy regime has triggered increased interest. Whether banks
have passed on the low interest rates to consumers in the form of low deposit rates to households
and lower loan rates to firms is a million dollar question these days.
Preliminary reports suggest that negative policy rates are transmitted to money market rates in the
same way as positive rates (BIS, 2016). In this section, the money market integration in these
countries is explored through the period 1997Q1 to 2016Q4, spanning various structural changes
in the financial sector. A mixed copula method is used with non-parametric weights developed in
the previous section to model the joint distribution of policy rates and other money market rates in
the paper. The results of the application for Denmark is demonstrated below in the form of Figure
1.3 and Figure 1.4.
Figure 1.3 clearly illustrates that the share of normal and frank dependence in the bivariate
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Figure 1.3: Varying Coefficient Weights
distribution has been declining post crisis with a compensating rise in the presence of copulas
with extreme dependence properties. While share of gumbel copula dependence has been rising
from the beginning and plateaued after a point, lately the bivariate distribution of short and long
run interest rates in Denmark has been showing evidence of negative dependence through the
rise of the weight on the clayton copula. We make 1000 draws from the estimated copula which
is exhibited in the form of a scatter plot in Figure 1.4. The value of β for Denmark is 0.895
and is statistically significant as illustrated by bootstrap standard errors. The positive sign on the
coefficient is suggestive of the fact that higher the share of financial system in the GDP, the stronger
is the money market integration.
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Figure 1.4: Random Draws from the Mixed Copula
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Chapter 2
Can We Still Lean Against the Wind?
Asset Price Volatility and Optimal Policy Mix in Overlapping
Generations Model
2.1 Introduction
Policy responsiveness to asset bubbles has been a subject of protracted debate among policy
makers and researchers alike for decades. The debate acquired renewed synergy during the global
crisis. A prevailing view during the late nineties was that monetary policy should not target asset
prices directly because it aggravates economic fluctuations but should rather focus on achieving
price stability and fortifying financial systems to survive asset price instability (Crockett 1998;
Bernanke and Gertler,2000). In fact, this literature saw little incremental value in adding asset
prices to monetary policy rules in terms of its contribution towards stabilizing output and inflation.
Price stability and financial stability were viewed as consistent and mutually reinforcing objectives
and strong monetary policy response to inflation as a sufficient instrument to contain the impact of
asset bubbles (Bernanke and Gertler,2000; Gilchrist and Leahy, 2002). In sharp contrast, according
to another school of thought, central banks response to asset bubbles was regarded as imperative
provided they carry non-trivial information in determining output and inflation (Goodhart and Hof-
mann, 2000a; Goodhart and Hofmann, 2000b; Filardo; 2001). In this case, a proactive monetary
restriction or ’leaning against the wind’ policies may be construed as an optimal policy when the
risk of a bust is large and the monetary authorities can defuse it at a relatively low cost in terms of
output and inflation sacrifices (Bordo and Jeanne; 2002).
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There is also an extant view that has gained popularity during the crisis. According to this view,
monetary policy is a blunt instrument in the sense that it may entail larger output and employment
losses unless there is a general macroeconomic overheating (Crowe et al; 2013). In fact, a closely
held view is monetary policy may not directly affect the bubble component of demand as it tends
to have a life of its own with less responsiveness to changes in policy rates due to inefficiencies in
asset markets (real estate) that allow positively serially correlated returns (Case and Shiller, 1989).
Amidst this debate, Gali (2014), in fact, questioned the theoretical validity of ’leaning against the
wind’ monetary policy response to asset bubbles. In a partial equilibrium analysis in his paper, Gali
(2014) has shown that while monetary tightening might lower the fundamental component of asset








(1/Rt+ j)Dt+k)) where R is the interest rate and D is the dividend flow),
contrary to conventional wisdom„ the ensuing rise in interest rates will raise the expected growth
of the bubble component. In a general equilibrium analysis with nominal rigidities following this,
Gali (2014) has shown central bank response to asset bubbles operating through the Taylor rule
aggravates volatility of bubbles. Thus any optimal monetary policy might have to strike a balance
between stabilization of aggregate demand which requires a positive interest rate response to the
bubble and stabilization of the bubble itself and hence future aggregate demand which requires a
negative interest rate response. If the size of the bubble is large enough, stabilization of the bubble
would be a predominant motive, making it optimal for the central bank to lower interest rates to
reign in a growing bubble.
In addition, a large segment of authors also propose that policy responsiveness to bubble should
depend on the type of the bubble and this literature leads to a different policy perspective. Studies
have illustrated that phases of bubble booms have been preceded by credit expansion which finds
its way into assets in fixed supply such as real estate and stocks and credit financed bubbles cause
deeper recessions and gradual recoveries (Allen and Gale, 2000; Kannan et al, 2009; Jorda et al;
2015, Brunnermeier and Schnabel; 2015, Miao and Wang; 2015). Thus while price stability may
promote financial stability, it concomitantly increases the likelihood that excess demand pressures
express first in terms of credit aggregates and asset prices rather than goods and services prices (Bo-
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rio and Lowe, 2002). Hence, there is an emerging view that while monetary policy should solely
be concerned with price stability, financial stability should be handled through microprudential
and macroprudential regulation. In fact, principal-agent problems, overwhelming changes in the
mode of contagion and ’disaster myopia’ theory that surfaced during the recent crisis, attribute an
indomitable niche of operation of macroprudential policy (Davis and Karim, 2010). While earlier
credit risk led to contagion, either through direct exposures or uncertainties on account of ambigu-
ous balance sheets, today contagion occurs via changes in market prices, measuring of risks and
mark-to-market practices in commercial banks which are more typical of investment banks (Shin,
2008). Macroprudential surveillance becomes necessary to avoid the building up of off-balance
sheet risks during monetary/fiscal bailout of weak financial institutions which share strategic com-
plementarities with their peers (Farhi and Tirole, 2009).
Post 2008 crisis, the emerging view about the ’risk taking’ channel of monetary policy trans-
mission has brought to the fore the coordination dimension of the monetary-macroprudential pol-
icy interaction. The risk-taking channel asserts that pass-through of monetary policy impulses
depends on the perception of risk and risk tolerance of economic agents. The evolving macropru-
dential regulatory capital framework plays a significant role in mapping monetary policy impulses
into ultimate bank portfolio and lending decisions through twin channels - capital threshold effect
and capital framework effect. Thus transmission of monetary policy impulses hinges on how the
bank perceives, manages and prices risks given the characteristics of the capital framework, the
capital cushion, underlying macroeconomic conditions and banks sensitivity to external financial
constraints (Borio and Zhu, 2008).
In the backdrop of these plethora of contrasting opinions on the subject, this paper revisits
the question, if Central Banks/regulatory authorities react to bubbles, what should be the policy
instrument. More significantly, should the Central Bank track the bubble directly using the nom-
inal interest rate (by introducing the misalignment in the price of the bubbly asset vis-a-vis the
fundamental in the monetary policy feedback rule) or is it more effective to take an indirect route
and track and temper the credit growth rate by influencing commercial bank’s cost of credit using
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macro-prudential policy. The question assumes significance in the light of both past comments in
theoretical analysis on the subject as well as current discourse on the subject. Bernanke and Gertler
(2000) have already pointed out that if capital markets are efficient and regulatory distortions are
absent, movements in asset prices simply reflect changes in underlying economic fundamentals.
Asset price volatility become an independent source of economic instability if non-fundamental
factors arising from poor regulatory practice and irrational behaviour underlie asset price move-
ments. In that case, the need for regulatory correction or an optimal mix of both monetary and
prudential policy cannot be overemphasized. Further, macroprudential surveillance is inevitable
given the ’financial fragility view’ (Minsky; 1978) and ’disaster myopia’ view. In the light of credit
emerging as a predominant factor behind speculative investment and the limitations of monetary
policy, it is reasonable to look beyond monetary policy instruments.
This paper extends Gali(2014) to explore the theoretical justification of macroprudential pol-
icy response to asset bubbles. Gali (2014) stopped short of introducing a financial sector in his
model and he left it as a future research agenda. This paper takes forward Gali’s(2014) work by
introducing credit frictions in his overlapping generations model with nominal rigidities, monop-
olistic competition, heterogenous agents and bankers. The main results from the paper may be
summarized as under
1. The model with credit frictions nests Gali(2014) results. One, monetary policy cannot in-
fluence the conditions for existence of a bubble, but it can influence the size and volatility
of bubble fluctuations. Two, a stronger interest rate response to bubble fluctuations such as
leaning against the wind policies may raise the volatility of asset prices and of their bubble
component.
2. Macro-prudential policy influences the conditions for existence of a bubble as well as its size
and volatility of fluctuations.
3. Minimisation of bubble fluctuations requires an active macro-prudential policy. However,
very tight macroprudential policy may induce banks to take higher risks which can be coun-
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terproductive.
4. In terms of monetary policy, like Gali (2014), there is conflict between stabilization of cur-
rent aggregate demand and future aggregate demand.
5. However, optimal macro-prudential policy may not have to strike a balance between stabi-
lization of current aggregate demand (which call for a negative response to the bubble) and
stabilization to the bubble itself (stabilization of future aggregate demand) which demands
an increasing response to the bubble, at least upto a threshold.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the literature on the subject. Section 3
lays down the framework of the overlapping generations model. Section 4 and Section 5 describe
the equilibrium conditions and dynamics of the deterministic case, respectively. Section 6 lays
down the log-linearized conditions of the stochastic model and the various sub-sections analyse
the flexible and sticky price cases. Section 7 describe the optimal policy experiments. Section 8
presents the empirical set up using vector autoregression (VAR) to validate the theoretical findings.
Section 9 concludes.
2.2 Literature Review
This paper relates to a wide arena of existing literature in asset bubbles and various macroeco-
nomic policies to manage bubbles. The traditional literature on rational bubbles is directly trace-
able to Samuelson (1958) and taken forward by Tirole (1985) where he analyzed conditions for
existence of rational bubbles in a production economy. The role of bubbles in these models was
to reduce inefficient investments and prevent dynamic inefficiency. However, the theoretical re-
sults of Samuelson (1958) and Tirole (1985) pointed towards a decline in investment and output
during bubbly episodes which was inconsistent with the macroeconomic data that characterizes
the bubbly episodes. Martin and Ventura (2012) resolved this disconnect by introducing investor
sentiment shocks and imperfect financial markets into the theory of rational bubbles. They showed
that bubbly episodes not only reduce inefficient investments but also raise efficient investments,
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thereby raising total investment and output, if the latter effect predominates. Martin and Ventura
(2014) added a credit market to the Tirole (1985) model and differentiated between fundamental
and bubbly collateral to show how investor optimism drives up the stock of bubbly collateral to
relax the collateral constraint giving rise to bubbles and credit and investment boom (crowding-in
effect), while investor pessimism can engineer a bubble burst, credit contraction and recession.
Miao and Wang (2011) developed a theory of credit driven stock price bubbles in production
economies in an infinite horizon model where the credit constraint is derived endogenously from
the incentive constraint in an optimal contracting problem. The collateral value of the firm is de-
rived from the incentive constraint as a going concern value of the firm which is priced in the stock
market and may contain a bubble as opposed to the more familiar liquidation value of the collater-
alised assets (Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)). Optimistic beliefs of both the borrower and the lender
that collateral value is driven by bubbles generates a positive feedback loop that makes their beliefs
self-fulfilling allowing bubbles to exist in their model. Some authors (Kocherlokota (2009), Miao
et al (2015)) also considered bubbles on land, which although an intrinsically useless asset, serves
as a collateral. Miao et al (2015) find that land bubble can generate inefficient overinvestment
reducing welfare in the net. Kocherlokota (2009) demonstrate that collapse of a land bubble may
lead to unrecoverable and immediate adverse impact on aggregate variables.
Contrary to Gali (2014), a number of papers have found support for active monetary policy re-
sponse to asset bubbles. Loisel et al (2009) find that asset bubbles that result from herd behaviour
in investment in a new technology whose productivity is uncertain can be prevented through tight
monetary policy intervention that makes borrowing expensive by entrepreneurs. Using an over-
lapping generations exchange economy model with portfolio choice between money and bubble,
Yvgard and Seegmuller (2015) find that a monetary policy rule incorporating asset prices can lo-
cally and globally stabilize fluctuations in contrast to rules that respond exclusively to inflation.
On the other hand, there is also substantial evidence supporting Gali(2014)’s views on monetary
policy response to the asset bubble. Faia and Monacelli (2007) study the role that asset prices
should play in optimal setting of monetary policy rules in an economy with nominal rigidities and
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credit market frictions following the agency cost framework of Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997). They
conclude that central banks should react to asset price bubbles by lowering interest rates. They
view asset prices as a tax that responds procyclically to positive productivity shocks distorting evo-
lution of investment. In a DSGE model context incorporating household debt dynamics, Gelain et
al (2015) have found that a systematic monetary policy response to an increasing debt-GDP ratio
or real debt levels, causes equilibrium indeterminacy and aggravates the volatility in the debt itself.
The paper is also related to a large body of research evaluating the monetary and macropru-
dential policy measures to manage bubbles. Martin and Ventura (2014) argue that a lender of last
resort can replicate an optimal bubble allocation by adopting ’leaning against the wind’ policy
by taxing credit when bubbly collateral is excessive and subsidizing it when it is inadequate. In
a historical analysis of bubbles, Brunnermeier and Schnabel (2016) have asserted that monetary
and macroprudential measures that lean against inflating bubbles are more effective in deflating
bubbles and associated economic crises. Extending the Doblas-Madrid (2012) model by adding
a credit market as a source of funds that fuels bubbles, Madrid and Lansing (2016) show that for
LTV caps below a certain threshold generates equillibria without risk shifting. Thus contractionary
monetary policy coupled with subdued LTV ratios can eliminate bubbles in their model. In the con-
text of analysing the dynamics of housing price and current account, Mendicino and Punzi (2014)
conclude that an welfare improving policy mix consists of an interest rate response to credit and
LTV ratio that countercyclically responds to housing price movements. Crowe et al(2013) present
a very clear perspective on the use of monetary and macroprudential policy to manage bubbles.
They recommend that monetary policy must be used as a complementary instrument and with a
leaning against the wind approach to ensure that macroprudential instruments are effective. The
optimal design of macroprudential policy would be to have robust rules that accommodates dis-
cretion when necessary enabling calibration to specific situations. In sharp contrast, Cechetti and
Kohler (2012) show that monetary and macroprudential policies are perfect substitutes and any in-
strument can be used to address the macroeconomic and financial stability objectives. If financial
stability is an outcome of sector specific shocks, then capital requirements are an appropriate tool
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to address it. On the other hand, interest rates can reach parts of financial intermediation which
are not under the regulatory purview. Using Fisherian debt-deflation model, Bianchi and Mendoza
(2015) find that an effective optimal macroprudential policy requires significant variation across
regimes of global liquidity and realizations of news shocks. The effectiveness of the policy varies
non-monotonically with the precision in the news about future income. When precision is low, ef-
fectiveness of policy improves as precision rises. But when precision is high, financial crisis occur
with lower probability and hence effectiveness of the policy falls with further rise in precision.
This paper is in spirit close to a number of other papers that study the interaction of monetary
and macroprudential policy and its impact on macroeconomic fluctuations but not necessarily asset
bubbles. Angeloni and Faia (2009) study a sticky price macro model with a fragile banking sector.
They recommend that mildly anticyclical capital ratios coupled with optimal monetary policy rule
that responds to bank leverage or asset prices can reduce macroeconomic fluctuations. Collard
et al (2012) derive jointly optimal policies using a model that views bank capital requirements as
a tool for addressing the risk taking incentives created by limited liability and deposit insurance.
They argue that locally optimal mandate of prudential policy is to ensure bank never funds inef-
ficient risky projects that accomplish their objectives with minimal damage in terms of increased
bank lending rates and decreased capital stock. And this distortion is minimized when capital
requirement is state dependant. Paoli and Paustian (2013) study the monetary-macroprudential
policy coordination in a New Keynesian model with nominal rigidities and credit frictions. They
find that introduction of macroprudential policy targeted directly at the credit market distortions
substantially improve welfare and coordination with monetary policy following cost push shocks.
In the context of analysing the nexus between central bank policy and real housing prices in New
Zealand, Shi et al(2014) have pointed out that real fixed interest rates do not have the desired
contractionary impact on real housing prices after controlling for household mortgage choice and
various economic conditions. Instead, mortgage rates, and within that fixed mortgage rates bear
a larger impact on housing prices. The paper recommends that policy makers should use macro-
prudential instruments such as lowering down payment levels and capping LTV ratios to influence
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the housing market particularly when the economy is open and central bank observes inflation tar-
geting. Using a sign-restricted VAR, Greenwood-Nimmo and Tarassow (2016) have found that a
contractionary monetary policy alone may raise financial fragility, while a macroprudential pol-
icy alone may not successfully reduce debt burden under fixed interest rates. But a coordinated
policy with interest rates adjustment, macroprudential policy shock may reduce financial fragility
enhancing financial stability. Many papers also find that welfare is higher, compared to a standard
Taylor rule, in regimes where policymakers respond to financial imbalances using the policy rate
or macroprudential rule (Bailliu et al, 2015)1.
In contrast with the earlier literature in rational bubbles, this paper considers the optimal mon-
etary and macroprudential policy in an overlapping generations model in a production economy
with banks and financial frictions. The paper works out the optimal policy mix that strikes a bal-
ance between stabilization of the bubble and stabilization of aggregate demand. In a similar spirit,
Madrid and Lansing (2016) assess the appropriateness of monetary and macroprudential policy im-
pact on credit-fuelled bubbles but their model falls short of having implications for optimal policy.
Further, unlike this paper, their model does not consider financial intermediation through banks.
The inclusion of the banking sector in the present paper with regulatory friction enables a study
of the behaviour of the banks with respect to different levels of capital adequacy parameter. An-
gelini and Faia (2009), Collard et al (2012), Paoli and Paustian (2013) and others as detailed above
also study monetary and macroprudential policy coordination but with respect to its implications
for the broader macroeconomy without any specific reference to asset bubbles. The paper also
distinguishes itself from papers like Miao and Wang (2015) and Miao et al (2015) which derive
collateral constraints from optimal contracting problem. This paper assume that debt repayments
are perfectly enforced.
1For a review of literature on macroprudential policy, please see Galati and Moessner(2011)
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2.3 Model
Consider a canonical 2-period Samuelson overlapping generations economy with an infinite
sequence of generations. Each generation contains a continuum of individuals of size one, indexed




where C1,t and C2,t are the consumption when young and old and are defined as in Gali (2014).
Like Gali(2014), assume that each individual is endowed at birth with δ∈[0,1] units of intrinsically
useless assets whose price is strictly positive, Qt|t > 0. Cases of Qt|t < 0 are ignored in line with
the theory that admits free disposal. Each period a fraction δ of each vintage of bubbly assets is
assumed to lose value i.e physically destroyed so that total amount of bubbly assets outstanding
remains constant and equal to one (Gali (2014)).
Each period, a subset IEt ⊆It of households become entrepreneurs and start new firms, while the
remaining set of households are called non-entrepreneurs. The entrepreneurs possess the knowl-
edge of how to produce differentiated goods. So in each period, there is a continuum of differenti-
ated goods available each produced by a different firm with a constant elasticity of substitution, η .
Each firm becomes operational in period 1 and the technical specification is given as.
Yt(i) = Nt(i) i ∈ [0,1] (2.1)
To highlight the supply side of credit, a fixed number of agents distinct from consumers, termed
bankers, who are infinitely lived and risk neutral are introduced. The bankers issue deposit liabil-
ities to non-entrepreneurial households at the beginning of each time period and provide financial
capital to entrepreneurs. I also assume, like Gali(2014) that there exists a market where the bubbly
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assets introduced by both current and previous cohorts can be traded by both entrepreneurs and
non-entrepreneurs.
All markets open at the beginning of the period and agents enter into contracts at the beginning
of the period. Receipts for work and lending and payment for consumption in period t occur at the
end of the period. All decisions are taken at discrete points in time.
2.3.1 Households
Each young non-entrepreneur sells his labor services inelastically for a real wage, Wt . He allo-
cates his total cash inflow at time t consisting of his real wage and asset endowment into consump-
tion (CNE1,t ), bank deposits (dt) yielding a nominal deposit interest rate of i
d
t and a variety of bubbly
assets introduced by both current and previous cohorts. We also assume that non-entrepreneurs
are stakeholders in firms and receive dividends in old age. The budget constraint for the young

















During old age, the non-entrepreneur consumes all his wealth consisting of interest income

























] = 1 (2.2)
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The entrepreneurs borrow bt from the bank when young and allocate the proceeds of their loans















−Wt +δQBt|t + yt/m
During old age, the entrepreneur pays for his consumption expenditure and interest on the loans















I first eliminate bt by solving for bt from the young entrepreneur’s budget constraint and sub-
stituting in place of bt in the old entrepreneurs budget constraint. The resulting constraint can then
be substituted into the objective function to turn the problem into an unconstrained optimisation
problem. The first order conditions emerging from the maximisation of the expected utility of
entrepreneurs with respect to CE1,t and Z
B














I assume that the entrepreneur cannot borrow more than his lifetime profit income i.e bt ≤









The firms are monopolistic competitors which sets the price of each good before the shocks
are realised and this assumption is the source of nominal rigidities in the model as in Gali (2014).






subject to the demand schedule Yt(i) = (
P?t
Pt










) which is the relevant discount factor. The optimal price setting rule is similar to Gali





where m = η
η−1
2.3.3 Bankers
The Bankers maximise profits subject to a simple balance sheet constraint. Bank profits at time
t are generated from the difference in cash inflow on account of gross interest paid by generation
(t-1) on loans offered during time (t-1) and the gross interest paid on deposit liabilities issued
to generation (t-1) which matures in period t. Macroprudential policy imposes a restriction on
financial intermediation that countercyclically affects the borrowing decision. As in Suh(2014), I
assume that regulatory authority implements macroprudential policy by countercyclically changing
the degree of regulation and banks face a cost when they fail to meet the regulatory requirement.
This paper assumes that regulatory authority asks banks to set aside a countercyclical capital buffer
which in turn imposes a cost that is increasing in the amount of loan assets held by banks, φ bbt
where φ b measures the central bank reaction to credit growth. Central Bank’s macro-prudential




Pt = Rbt−1bt−1−bt +dt−Rdt−1dt−1−φ bbt−1
subject to
bt = dt





2.3.4 Monetary Policy Rule
The central bank sets the short term nominal deposit interest rate idt according to the following
rule.
1+ idt = R̄dEt(πt+1)(πt/π)
φπ (QBt /Q
B)φq
where πt is gross inflation and π is the target inflation rate. The real interest rate responds
to fluctuations in inflation and aggregate bubble, with parameters φπ and φq, where φπ > 0 by
assumption.
2.4 Equilibrium








bbt−1 ∀i ∈ [0,1], ∀t







(1−η) ) and using consumers
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We assume all firms set identical prices and produce identical quantities in the symmetric equi-




Yt(i)di = 1 (2.8)
Evaluating the optimal price setting condition under sticky price in symmetric equilibrium
yields
Et−1[(1/C2,t)(1−mWt)] = 0
which implies a constant real wage Wt = 1/m
Asset market clearing conditions are similar to Gali (2014),
ZBt|t−k = δ (1−δ )
k (2.9)












Also, U = δQt|t denote the aggregate market value of newly introduced bubbles. The following
equilibrium condition then follows from and previous definitions:
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Let us start by assuming Ut =U > 0 and Bt −Et−1(Bt) = 0 for all t. Under certainty, optimal
price setting condition implies Wt = 1/m. Now from the income approach, since Yt = 2Dt +Wt ,
Dt = (m− 1)/2m. The consumption of young and old non-entrepreneurs are given as CNE1,t =
1/m−bt−Bt and CNE2,t = (1−1/m)+Bt +Rdt−1dt−1. The real interest rate is then given as
Rdt =
((1−1/m)+Bt+1)
(β NE(1/m−Bt)− (1+β NE)bt)
= Rd(Bt ,Bt+1)
Equillibrium allocations can be determined given an equilibrium process for bubble Bt which






Substituting Rt d from above into the equation and rearranging, this equation produces the law




β NE(1/m−Bt−bt)− (Bt +U)St
= L(Bt ,Bt+1) (2.13)
where St = 1+ btβ NE(1/m−Bt)−(1+β NE)bt .






2m ] ∀t and some U ≥ 0.
2.5.1 Stability Analysis
Like Gali (2014), we assume that the function L(Bt ,U) abides by the following properties
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2. dL(Bt ,U)dBt =





> 0 f or 0≤ B < BH
3. dL(Bt ,U)dU =
β NE St(1−1/m)(1/m−Bt−bt)
[β NE(1/m−bt−Bt)−(Bt+U)St ]2






0≤ B < BH
4. d
2L(Bt ,U)
dBdU > 0 for 0≤ B < B
H





Consider the case of bubbleless economy, i.e if Bt = 0, then steady state exists as L(0,0)=0.
A necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a bubbly steady state B̄U > 0 such that
L(B̄U ,0) = B̄U is dBt+1dBt |0,0< 1 which leads us to the existence condition





In this case, L(Bt ,0)> 0 for any Bt > BU . Thus the solution to Bt+1 = L(Bt ,0) given an initial
condition B0 > BU violates the constraint Bt < BH and hence is not consistent with equillibrium.
On the other hand, L(Bt ,0) < Bt for any Bt < BU indicating that the solution to Bt+1 = L(Bt ,0)
given an initial condition B0 < BU converges to the bubbleless steady state B = 0. Hence, BU is an
unstable steady state.
It is also evident that at the bubbleless steady state, Rd(0)< 1 which corresponds to the negative




To study the stochastic behaviour of the model, we log-linearize the system around the non-






The log-linearized budget equations can be written as
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Et−1(ŵt) = Et−1(d̂t) = 0 (2.22)
r̂dt = φπ π̂t +φqq̂Bt (2.23)
B̂t = R̄dB̂t−1 +(1− R̄d)ût−1 + r̂dt−1 +ζt (2.24)
( ˆC1,t
NE










+φ bb̂t = 0 (2.25)
As in Gali (2014), assume that ζt is a martingale difference stochastic process such that Et−1(ζt)=
0. It is an exogenous sunspot shock whose variance is independent of monetary policy.
Lets examine the flexible price case first. When firms adjust their prices once the shocks are
realized, they optimally choose to maintain their gross mark-up m which in turn implies that the
wage and dividend remains constant at their steady state values. Hence, equation 2.22 is replaced
by the following
ŵt = d̂t = 0 (2.26)




























It is evident from Equation (2.27) that under flexible prices,though real interest rates are in-
dependent of monetary policy parameters (φπ or φq), it is not independent of capital adequacy
parameters which enters through R̄b. Substituting r̂dt from equation 2.27 into equation 2.24, yields
the law of motion of the bubble.
























)(1− R̄d)ût−1 + ζt
(2.28)








)] lies in [0,1). Due
to its inability to impact the real interest rate, monetary policy has no influence on the evolution of
the bubble. But the law of the motion of the bubble depends on credit conditions in the economy
which can be controlled by manipulating the cost of intermediation by the regulatory authorities.
On the other hand, both monetary and macroprudential policy impact inflation and other nom-
inal variables. Inflation inherits the persistence in the bubble. Combining the Taylor rule under
equation 2.23 and equation 2.20, the following law of motion of inflation can be derived


























Equation 2.29 predicts that for a given level of φ b, a positive systematic response of the interest
rate to aggregate bubble is desirable (φq > 0) from the viewpoint of inflation stabilization. This
claim is substantiated once we look at the variance of inflation given as
(2.30)














































2.6.1 Sticky Price Equilibrium
Combining equations 2.14-2.17 and equation 2.24 and 2.25, goods market clearing condition






































)b̂t−φ bb̄b̂t−1 +φ bb̄b̂t = 0 (2.31)
Taking expectations, using equation 2.22 and after rearranging the above equation leads to

















+ φ b)Et−1(b̂t) − φ bb̄b̂t−1 (2.32)
















)]. With the assumption under equation
22, and with pre-determination of prices (Et−1(πt)), combining the previous equation with the
interest rate rule, the closed form solution for the law of motion of the bubble can be written as.
(2.33)





















+ φ b)Et−2( ˆbt−1) + ζt





)] ∈ (0,1) is the autoregressive coefficient that measures
the persistence of bubble fluctuations and is independent of monetary policy parameters. Although
the persistence term is independant of monetay policy parameters, as also in Gali (2014) choice
of φq may influence bubble’s overall size and volatility. Macro-prudential policy parameters, on
the other hand, influence the persistence of the bubbles through the term V in addition to its size
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and volatility as is evident from the following anticipated component of the bubble Et−1(B̂t) which
evolves as an AR(1) process,
(2.34)





















+ φ b)( ˆbt−1)
In other words, in the presence of nominal rigidities, monetary policy affects the size of the
bubble and the allocation of consumption across cohorts and hence welfare by influencing the real
interest rate. An analysis of volatility of bubble shows that a leaning against the wind monetary
policy (φq > 0) generates a larger volatility in the bubble than a policy of neglect (φq = 0) (Fig-
ure:2.1). Given a finite value of φ b, bubble volatility is minimised at φq = −1. These conditions
would completely stabilize the anticipated component of the bubble. Hence, the results of the
model with financial frictions nests Gali(2014)’s remarks. Stabilization of the bubble requires that


















But the dynamics of macroprudential policy including its impact on credit, interest rate and
bubble is much more convoluted. And an ideal way to trace and understand these complex dynam-
ics would be to plot the bubble volatility against macro-prudential parameter (φ b). Two important
observations emerge from these figures. One, the relationship between bubble volatility and macro-
prudential parameters is non-monotonic. Bubble volatility initially declines when φ b lies between
0 and a threshold value, φ̄ b, and then increases monotonically. Two, as the interest rate response
of monetary policy to the bubble gets stronger, it necessitates a stronger macro-prudential policy
response to absorb the excess volatility generated by strong monetary policy on bubble volatility
(Figure:2.2). In other words, performance of macro-prudential policy supports monetary policy.
These dynamics can be explained within the model. Lets consider the first observation, non-
monotonicity of the relationship between bubble volatility and macroprudential parameter. It is
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Figure 2.1: Monetary Policy and Bubble Volatility
easy to see from equation 2.35 that volatility in credit has a positive cumulative impact on volatil-
ity of bubbles. When φ b is below a threshold value φ̃ b, interest rate spreads are contained which
implies that the factor V may actually rise in value with small increases in φ b leading to a dampen-
ing impact of current bubble shocks on future bubbles. The volatility of bubbles actually declines
at small levels of φ b as the rise in V offsets the positive cumulative impact of volatile credit. But
for large increases in φ b, leading to large interest rate spreads, V may actually decline raising the
volatility of bubbles. 2
But as φ b increases beyond φ̄ b, increases in φ b leads to higher interest rate spreads. The
ensuing rise in lending rates poses a decision problem for the entrepreneurs who has to now choose
between higher consumption today with higher borrowing and lower consumption in old age due
to increased debt burden on account of higher interest rate. In other words, while monetary policy
affects the size of the bubble and the incentives for intertemporal allocation of consumption of both
entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs by influencing the real deposit rate, macroprudential policy
2Baseline settings assume m = 1.2, B = 0.001, var(b̂t) = 0.01, σε = 0.01
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Figure 2.2: Macro-prudential Policy and Bubble Volatility
affects the intertemporal consumption allocation decision of only the entrepreneurs through the
lending rate channel affecting their welfare.
In sum, the bubble is under a twin effect, monetary policy which necessitates a decreasing inter-
est rate response to the bubble and macroprudential policy which requires an increasing response
to the bubble and works through the lending rate channel. While a necessary condition for minimi-
sation of bubble volatility is to set φq =−1 or passive monetary policy, an active macroprudential
policy parameter, φ b ≤ φ̄ b minimises bubble volatility given a finite value of φq. Further, macro-
prudential policies influence the size and volatility of the bubble both under flexible (Equation
2.28) as well as sticky prices(Equation 2.33).
Table 2.1 and Figure 2.2 display the bubble standard deviation against the macroprudential
parameter under changing monetary policy stance. As the interest rate response to the bubble
strengthens, macroprudential parameter that minimises the bubble volatility also increases so as to
absorb the excess volatility created by monetary policy.
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Table 2.1: Macro-prudential Policy Coefficient - (φ b)? = argmin(Var(B̂t))
Monetary Policy Stance Monetary Policy Coef. Macro-prudential Policy Coef. Bubble Std.Dev
Passive -1 0.0327 0.003
Benign Neglect 0 0.1030 0.1033
Very Active 5 0.4601 0.6200
Very Very Active 10 0.8876 1.1367
Under sticky prices, equilibrium inflation in the economy is given as


























































Inflation inherits the persistence in bubbles but unlike Gali (2014), past credit growth and errors
in expected credit growth is contributing to inflation. The only feasible strategy before the central
bank to stabilise inflation under these circumstances is to respond very strongly to inflation by
setting φπ arbitrarily large, for any finite φq and φ b. Setting φ q = −1 may minimise variance of
the bubble, but it is not sufficient to stabilise inflation.
2.7 Optimal Policy Mix
I take as welfare criterion the weighted unconditional mean of savers and borrowers in the
economy, where w is the weight on the savers (Quint and Rabanal (2014)). Around the steady
state, the mean can be approximated up to the second order as
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(2.37)
wE[log(CNE1,t ) + β
NE log(CNE2,t+1)] + (1− w)E[log(CE1,t) + β E log(CE2,t+1)]
∼= wE[log(CNE1,t ) + β NE log(CNE2,t+1)− 0.5(var(ĈNE1,t ) + β NEvar(ĈNE2,t ))]
+ (1− w)E[log(CE1,t) + β E log(CE2,t+1)− 0.5(var(ĈE1,t) + β Evar(ĈE2,t))]






2,t = 1, welfare maximization
amounts to minimizing wvar(CNE2,t )+ (1−w)var(CE2,t)+ (φ b)2var(b̂t). Substituting the values of
ˆCNE2,t and
ˆCE2,t from equation 2.17 and 2.19 into the required minimisation, the following expression
is derived



































































)2 +(φ b)2]b̂t (2.38)
where W = [w( 1
C̄2
NE )
2 + (1−w)( 1
C̄2
E )
2]. Prior to analysing the implications on welfare, it
is important to undertake a post mortem of the above equation. Minimisation of volatility of














This requires the central bank to adjust interest rate upward in response to positive bubble
shocks to stabilize current aggregate demand, a policy which is in conflict with the policy of min-
imisation of bubble volatility which requires a downward adjustment of interest rates in response to
the bubble. Contrary to this, the setting of macro-prudential policy parameter creates no dilemma
for the authorities, at least below the threshold level of macroprudential policy parameter. As
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Figure 2.3: Macro-prudential Policy and Dividend Volatility
demonstrated in the last section, minimisation of bubble volatility requires setting of an active
macro-prudential parameter below a certain bound but the optimizing value of this parameter must
rise with the increasing monetary policy response to the bubble. Stabilization of dividends also re-
quires an increasing macroprudential response to the bubble as is evident from Figure 2.3. As both
policies point in the same direction, the welfare maximizing φ b marries the twin policies of stabi-
lization of dividends and stabilization of the bubble, at least until the macroprudential parameter is
below the threshold.
Figure 4 shows the expected welfare loss as a function of φq and φ b, respectively under model’s
baseline parameter settings. Differentiating equation 2.28 with respect to φq yields the welfare
















Table 2.2: Optimal Macro-prudential Policy Coefficient
Monetary Policy Stance Monetary Policy Coef. Macro-prudential Policy Coef.
Passive -1 0.4
Active 5 1.067
Very Active 10 1.267
The optimal coefficient is largely monotonically decreasing in the size of the bubble as is evi-
dent from Figure 5. As the steady state size of the bubble approaches zero, the optimal coefficient
converges to zero. But as the bubble approaches its maximum value consistent with the stationarity
such that Λ→ 1, then limB→B? φ??q = −1, which asymptotically tends to a negative number when
the gross interest rate is greater than one. Hence, given a large bubble consistent with steady state,
it is optimal for central bank to lower interest rates in response to a rise in the size of the bubble.
The optimal macro-prudential coefficient is difficult to estimate analytically as the differentia-
tion of equation 41 with respect to φ b yields an implicit function in φ b. However, an investigation
of the plot of welfare losses vis-a-vis φ b shows that the minimum of the loss function is attained
between 0 and 2.
2.8 Empirical Validation
The theoretical results of the previous section are empirically validated using structural and
sign restrictions VAR to assess the macroprudential role of loan loss provisions on business cycles
and asset prices in the US. Loan loss provisions and supervisory capital requirements based upon
the level of risk in a bank’s financial positions are directly linked (Angklomkliew et al (2009)). The
agreement on the framework for capital adequacy reached in July 1988 by the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision with the endorsement of central bank governors of Group of Ten countries
made general provisions and loan loss reserves a part of Tier 2 capital or supplemental capital.
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Basel III continued with this arrangement and allowed for inclusion of provisions in the Tier 2
capital. In 2013, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Regulatory Board (FRB) and
Office of the Controller of currency (OCC) issued guidelines for insured depository institutions in
the US that align with Basel III capital standards. Under these guidelines, Tier 2 capital includes the
allowance for loan and lease losses upto 1.25 per cent of risk-weighted assets, qualifying preferred
stock, subordinated debt and sundry other assets in the US. Thus the contribution of loan loss
reserves as a macroprudential policy tool, though underestimated in empirical studies in the past,
can no longer be overlooked in the post global crisis economic environment (Zilberman and Tayler
(2015)).
However, a major issue with designing macro-prudential instruments is the alleged procycli-
cality of these instruments. Downturns in business cycles are associated with deterioration of bank
asset quality and hence increased risk exposure coupled with rise in capital requirements at a time
when raising fresh capital from the market is difficult and banks are forced to downsize their lend-
ing. Similarly, during cyclical downturns, with heightened likelihood of loan defaults, banks are
likely to respond by hiking provision requirements, further dampening the credit cycle and exacer-
bating the downward cycle. While low interest rates and increasing house prices have contributed
to lower provisions, structural factors like improvement in risk management techniques and avail-
ability of novel instruments like securitisation which enable banks to offload a part of their credit
risk have also contributed in moderating provision levels in the banking system (ECB, 2004). An
adjacent view by Borio (2001) and Lowe (2002) reinforce this argument. They argue that increased
lending is associated with less critical assessment of creditworthiness which in turn induces build-
ing up of risks and financial imbalances during upswings raising the probability of a downturn.
With this failed experience in the background, global policymakers are currently experimenting
with forward looking provisions. Along with the impact of provisions shock on business cycles,
this paper also looks at the impact of forward looking or dynamic provisions on various variables.
I set up a simple SVAR model under two different specifications and check the robustness of















































































































































































































Figure 2.4: Cross Country Trends in Loan Loss Provisions
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Q4 for the US economy. Data on US GDP (y), GDP deflator (p), prime loan rate of banks (r), S
and P 500 stock price index (s),loan loss reserves to total loans (l) and commercial and industrial
loans (c) has been sourced from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis database. Commodity prices
(c) have been downloaded from the World Bank database and S and P 500 dividends (d) from
Robert Shiller’s webpage. The first specification is akin to the recursive ordering of variables
in Gali and Gambetti (2015) with the addition of loan loss provisions and interest rate spread.
The identification strategy in the second specification derives from the theoretical model detailed
above. We check the robustness of the results by re-estimating the model with pre crisis data from
1985:1-2007:4.
2.8.1 Theory on Loan Loss Provisions
Loan loss provisions have, hitherto, been governed by International Accounting Standards (IAS
39) which require banks to adopt an Incurred Loss Approach of loan loss provisioning whereby
provisions are made only if losses are actually incurred. This gives prominence only to the specific
provisions component of provisions which depend on expected losses on loans that have been
identified as impaired or non-performing. General provisions category of loan loss provisions
which depend on expected losses that cannot be supported by loan specific documentation and
hence are more forward looking receive much less importance under the prevailing accounting
system (Bouvatier and Lepetit (2012); Agenor and Zilberman (2013)). In other words, under
the incurred loss model, loan losses are recognised quite late in the credit cycle and hence this
component of loan loss provisions is susceptible to procyclicality (BIS; 2009).
To mitigate procyclicality, post crisis, this accounting system is proposed to be amended by
shifting to an expected loss approach. A more forward looking provisioning system, also known
as dynamic or statistical provisioning system is proposed as an alternative institutional arrangement
to cover expected loan losses. Under this approach, banks predict the latent risks over the business
cycle of the loan portfolio. Statistical provisions are defined as the estimated latent losses net
of specific provisions. During upswings in business cycle, specific provisions are low and hence
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banks accumulate a coffer of statistical provisions which can be used during downturns to handle
contemporaneous problem loans. Thus statistical provisions are used to offset countercyclical
evolution of specific provisions and total loan loss provisions are smoothed overtime (Bouvatier
and Lepetit; 2012).
The literature on loan loss provisioning, empirical and theoretical, have largely revolved around
the impact of loan loss provisioning on business cycles (Pool et al (2014), Agenor and Zilberman
(2015), Zilberman and Taylor (2015)), signalling effect of loan loss provisioning announcements
(Blose (2001), Docking et al (1997), Kanagaretnam (2005)) and the procyclicality of loan loss pro-
visioning. Using panel vector autoregression, Pool et al (2014) find that increased loan loss provi-
sioning is an indicator of increasing credit risk of the banking system which leads to lower bank
lending and economic activity. The literature on loan loss provisions exhibit that loan loss provi-
sions can be decomposed into discretionary and non-discretionary components. While, the discre-
tionary component refers to loan loss provisions made for managerial objectives such as income
smoothing, capital management or signalling, non-discretionary component represents loan loss
provisions made to cover expected credit losses (Whalen, 1994; Beaver and Engel, 1996; Hasan
and Wall, 2004; Bouvatier and Lepetit, 2008). The non-discretionary component can be further de-
composed to separate the backward looking components which relate to non-performing loans or
identified problem loans and forward looking components represented by risk of default emerging
from unidentified loan losses. A number of studies have found that non-discretionary loan loss pro-
visioning under backward looking provisioning amplify procyclicality of bank lending (Bouvatier
and Lepetit;2014). Agenor and Zilberman (2015) use a dsge model with credit market imperfec-
tions to show that a dynamic provisioning system combined with credit gap-augmented Taylor rule
can mitigate real and financial fluctuations. They find that standard Taylor rules combined with dy-
namic provisions score over credit-gap augmented Taylor rules. Zilberman and Tayler (2015) study
the optimal monetary policy response in a dsge model with loan loss provisioning rules and nomi-
nal rigidities. They find that a backward looking provisioning regime induces financial accelerator
mechanisms resulting in price, financial and macroeconomic instability. Dynamic provisioning, on
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the other hand, attenuate welfare losses and also moderate the anti-inflationary stance of monetary
policy. They find that a standard Taylor rule coupled with dynamic provisioning is an optimal pol-
icy response to financial shocks. Blose (2001) studied the market reaction to press announcements
of loan loss provisioning in the banking industry. He established that informational asymmetry
regarding asset value and costs associated with capital adequacy regulation generate negative re-
actions. He also found that type of reaction depends on type of asset being provisioned. While
announcements regarding provisioning of foreign debt induce positive market reactions, announce-
ments of provisioning of real estate loans and other types of debt lead to negative market reactions.
Docking et al (1997) also underscored the negative and statistically significant signalling impact
of announcement effects of bank loan loss reserves. Kanagaretnam et al (2005) document that
bank managers use their discretion in estimating loan loss provisions to communicate private in-
formation about their bank’s future prospects depending on different incentives. They established
that these announcements have significant contagion effects on non-announcing regional banks.
Propensity to signal private information vary systematically with bank size, earnings variability,
future investment opportunities and degree of income smoothing. A number of studies look at the
procyclicality of the loan loss provisioning system (Laeven and Majnoni (2001), Bouvatier and
Lepetit (2012a), (2012b)). Bouvatier and Lepetit (2012a) find that backward looking provision-
ing system aggravates the cyclicality of bank lending, with the effect being relatively stronger for
emerging economies. In a similar theoretical study of the issue, Bouvatier and Lepetit (2012b)
establish that while a backward looking provisioning system amplifies the procyclicality of loan
market fluctuations, a forward looking or dynamic system of provisioning smoothes the evolution
of total loan loss provisions, eradicating procyclicality. Bushman and Williams (2012) point out a
trade-off between reduced procyclicality and loss of transparency leading to dampening of market
discipline and imprudent risk taking in forward looking provisioning system. However, none of the
above studies draw attention to the impact of provisions on asset bubbles and this empirical study
fills up this gap substantiating the theoretical results from the overlapping generations model set out
above. The literature on loan loss provisioning is at an early stage and to the best of our knowledge
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this is the first paper that looks at the joint impact of monetary policy and loan loss provisioning
on asset bubbles. Further, to accomplish these goals, I follow a sign restrictions approach which
is also an added attraction of this paper. Unlike the monetary policy theory, the theory of macro-
prudential policy is pre-mature. Hence, sign restrictions approach is clearly a useful procedure in
the assessment of macroprudential policy shocks as there is relatively little theoretical guidance (as
compared to the volume of work on monetary policy) on how such a policy reacts to or is reacted to.
2.8.2 Identification Strategy
2.8.2.1 Recursive VAR
1. (6 variable VAR)
Consider the following summative reduced form VAR model
xt = P1xt−1 + et (2.40)
where xt is nx1 vector of variables and Σe = Et(ete′t). Let Q0 be a cholesky factor of Σe
such that Σe = Q0Q′0. Pre-multiplying (1) by Q0, we have the structural representation of the
model given as
Q0xt = Q1xt−1 + εt (2.41)
implying that structural shocks are linear combinations of VAR errors, Q0et = εt and E(εtε ′t )=
Σε , where Σε is a positive definite matrix. Identification of structural shocks thus depends on
the construction of an appropriate set of weights (Q0) on êt (Fry and Pagan (2011)). The re-
cursive approach restricts Q0 matrix to a lower triangular matrix with a unit diagonal which
implies the decomposition of variance-covariance matrix Σe =Q−10 Σε(Q
−1
0 )
′. In the first part
of the empirical exercise, the choice of variables and identification strategy follows Chris-
tiano et al (1998). As Christiano et al (1998) explains the vector of endogenous variables
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can be partitioned into three blocks: zt is the set of policy instruments; x1,t is the set of those
variables whose contemporaneous values appear in the information set of the policymaker
at time t and x2,t is the set of variables that appear with a lag in the information set. In other
words, recursiveness assumption implies that time t variables that appear in the information
set of the policy maker do not respond to time t realizations of the policy shock. Instead,
they respond with a lag to the policy shock. Define xt = [yt ,divt , pt , pcomt , policyvariable,st ]
where yt is log (output), divt is log (dividends), pt log (prices), pcomt is log (commodity
prices), the policy variable is either it , the short term nominal interest rate or l pt , the log
(loan loss provisions) and st is the log (stock price index). The policy block in this model
consists of zt = [it , l pt ], x1,t = [y[t],divt , pt , pcomt ] whose contemporaneous values appear in
the information set of the policymaker at time t and x2,t = [st ] which appear with a lag in the
information set.
The first specification is similar to Gali and Gambetti (2015) with interest preceding stock
prices. This is the standard Taylor rule which can be viewed as incorporating a pre-emptive
response to bubbles with a view to mitigating future risk of inflation since effects of asset
price fluctuations are included in the changes in the output gap guiding short term nominal
interest rate (Bernanke and Gertler (1999),Shirutsuka (2000)). I also consider another speci-
fication allowing for endogenous contemporaneous response of interest rates to stock prices
in line with the familiar ’leaning against the wind’ policy. This amounts to interpreting the
Taylor rule as directly including information about stock prices. The recursiveness assump-
tion thus places the following zero restrictions on Q0 and the linear relationship between
reduced form errors and structural errors can be expressed as under.
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
1 0 0 0 0 0
−βdy 1 0 0 0 0
−βpy −βpd 1 0 0 0
−βcy −βcd −βcp 1 0 0
−βsy −βsd −βsp −βsc 1 0












1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0










The results are similar when I use either the policy rate or the lending rate. To evaluate
the impact of pure provisions shock on asset prices, two identification strategies have been
used. One, provisions are allowed to react to output such that provisions are ordered after
output, dividends and prices in that order and stock prices are ordered last. Two, endogenous
contemporaneous response of provisions to stock prices is allowed for such that stock prices
respond contemporaneously to all variables except provisions, while provisions are ordered
last and hence it responds contemporaneously to all variables. The recursiveness assumption
thus places the following zero restrictions on Q0 and the linear relationship between reduced
form errors and structural errors can be expressed as below.

1 0 0 0 0 0
−βdy 1 0 0 0 0
−βpy −βpd 1 0 0 0
−βcy −βcd −βcp 1 0 0
−βsy −βsd −βsp −βsc 1 0












1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0










To evaluate the impact of provisions shock on asset prices in the presence of interest rates,
three types of identification strategies are implemented. One, provisions are ordered after the
interest rate implying that regulatory reaction function incorporates current information on
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monetary policy. This represents provisions shock with a standard Taylor rule. Two, interest
rate are ordered after provisions implying that central bank incorporates current information
about the provisions. This represents the provisions shock with augmented Taylor rule. Both
these identification strategies seem to resemble the situation where monetary policy and
supervisory functions are undertaken by the same authority. In contrast, in the third strategy,
it is assumed that monetary policy and provisions policy do not react to each other. This is
incorporated by assuming that the coefficient on contemporaneous response of provisions to
monetary policy is zero in the matrix Q0.

1 0 0 0 0 0
−βdy 1 0 0 0 0 0
−βpy −βpd 1 0 0 0 0
−βcy −βcd −βcp 1 0 0 0
−βry −βrd −βrp −βrc 1 0 0
−βly −βld −βl p −βlc 0 1 0













1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0











I also use interest rate spread (lending rate minus policy rate) in place of the lending rate
or policy rate to estimate the model under recursive identification. According to the bank
equilibrium condition interest rate spreads are determined by provisions. So spread is or-
dered after provisions but prior to stock prices. Next I introduce credit into this specification
which reacts contemporaneously to GDP growth and dividend growth, while inflation re-
sponds concurrently to GDP growth, dividend growth and credit growth. This specification
is close to the model although the recursive assumption may be construed as too restrictive
which I relax in the following section.
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2. (7-Variable VAR System)
In this section, I separate the static and dynamic components of loan loss provisions draw-
ing on the recent accounting literature. I accomplish this by incorporating non-performing
assets into the VAR and ordering it before the provisions. Non-performing loans are com-
memorative of identified credit losses in the financial system. So a shock to provisions after
controlling for non-performing assets can be identified as a shock to dynamic provisioning.
So in this case, output is ordered first, dividends second, inflation and commodity prices
third and fourth,followed by NPAs and provisions and finally share prices are ordered last.
2.8.2.2 Non-Recursive Ordering
In the second specification, I set up a SVAR model with GDP growth, dividend growth, credit
growth, inflation, loan loss provisions, credit spread and stock prices. I try to identify provisions
shocks, credit shocks, technological shocks, dividends shocks, inflation shocks, interest rate spread
shocks and optimism shocks by imposing zero restrictions in the contemporaneous impact matrix
in accordance with the theoretical model detailed in the paper. Provisions shocks are assumed to
be affecting the inflation (βpl), credit (βcl), interest rate spreads (βspr,l) and stock prices (βsl) con-
temporaneously. This may be deemed from the bank equilibrium condition in equation 6 where
the spread of the lending rate over the policy rate is equivalent to the provisions parameter. Sim-
ilarly the assumption about price inflation responding contemporaneously to provisions shocks
emanates from equation 36. Negative credit or liquidity shocks is likely to put pressure on interest
rate spreads (βspr,c).
Output responds to supply shocks only. Dividends are a barometer of good corporate perfor-
mance and higher industrial output which can be associated with higher credit to entrepreneurs
that enables latter to hire more labor and produce more output by model construction. Policy rate
responds to inflationary shocks according to the monetary policy feedback rule assumed in the
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model. Shocks in interest rate spreads is likely to affect lending rate spreads over the policy rate
(βspr,sp) as well as stock prices concurrently (βssp). Stock prices respond to all the shocks, while
optimism shocks do not affect any variable except stock prices. The impact matrix now looks like
A0 =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0
βdy 1 0 0 0 0 0
βpy βpd 1 0 βpl 0 0
βcy βcd βcp 1 βpl 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0
βspry βsprd βsprc βsprp βsprl 1 0
βsy βsd βsc βsp βsl βssp 1

2.8.3 Sign-Restrictions Approach
2.8.3.1 Mountford and Uhlig Approach
Vector autoregression is a principle tool for extracting information about the macroeconomy
thanks to the seminal work of Sims (1980). However, a debatable issue in the VAR literature is to
how to identify the structural shocks from the reduced form. Uhlig (1998) argues that reasonable
identification is decided based on what it ought to be. For example, monetary policy shocks are
identified by the fact that monetary policy contraction should raise interest rates, reduce output and
prices. If a particular identification scheme meets the reasonability criteria, it is successful, other-
wise it is a puzzle. Uhlig (1998) refers to this as a circular reasoning as economists are accepting
results that they want to hear. Instead, Uhlig (1998) proposes a method where he prefers to keep
the broader theoretical question open and allow the data to decide how a policy shock may affect
the key variables in the economic system. He accomplishes this by imposing sign restrictions on
impulse responses of some variables while being agnostic about others. In other words, this pro-
cedure amounts to combining minimal a priori theorizing (assumptions that enjoy broad support)
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with empirical assessment of the question of interest.






where M(k) is the k-th period impulse response of xt+k to a unit change in et and M0 = In. The






with impulse responses to εt being N j = M jQ−0 = M jN0.
Assume R̂ be the matrix containing the standard deviations of the structural shocks on the




ε̂t = Û Γ̂t (2.44)
where t̂ = R̂−1ε̂t are the rescaled structural shocks possessing unit variance. Let S be an or-
thonormal matrix such that SS′ = S′S = In, then we can express a new set of structural shocks as
combination of existing shocks such as γ̂t? = Sγ̂t .
Following from equation (5) above, we can now express the reduced form VAR errors as
(2.45)
êt = Û γ̂t
= ÛS′Sγ̂t
= Û?γ̂t?
and Cov(γ̂t?γ̂t?) = SCov(γ̂t γ̂t)S′ = In. In other words, we have found a new set of shocks γ̂t?
that have the same covariance matrix as γ̂t but which will have a different impact (U?) upon êt and
hence the variable xt .




xt = Q−10 R̂R̂
−1
ε̂tM0 + Q−10 R̂R̂
−1 ˆεt−1M1 + ..........
= Û γ̂tM0 + Û ˆγt−1M1 + .............
= Ñ0γ̂t + Ñ1 ˆγt−1 + ...........
But since êt = Û?γ̂t?, there can be an alternative structural MA representation such that
(2.47)
xt = Û?γ̂t?M0 + Û? ˆγt−1?M1 + Û? ˆγt−2?M2 + ....
= N?0 γ̂t
? + N?1 ˆγt−1







where N(k)? = ˆU(k)S′M(k). So the impulse response vector of variables to a structural shock
that corresponds to the j-th element of εt at horizon k is the j-th column of N(k)? , denoted by
n( j)(k)
n( j)(k) = ˆU(k)s( j)M(k)
where s( j) is the j-th column of S.
Following the penalty function approach of Mountford and Uhlig(2009), that minimises the
criterion function for sign restrictions, we have
s? = argminφ(s)
subject to s′s = 1


















where g is the penalty function given by g(u) = 100u if u≥ 0 and g(u) = u if u < 0
The computations are performed, using a Bayesian approach as detailed in Uhlig (2005) and
Mountford and Uhlig (2005). A number of draws are taken from the posterior. For each draw from
65
the posterior of the VAR coefficients and the variance-covariance matrix,the shocks are identified
using the criteria described above. Given the sample of draws for the impulse responses, confidence
bands are also plotted.
2.8.3.2 Identification under Sign Restrictions
I distinguish between three principle shocks - business cycle shock, monetary policy shock and
provisions shock. In the literature, the business cycle shock has been identified with positive sign
on impulse responses of output (Uhlig and Mountford;2008, Beaudry et al;2011)(Identification
TI). I also experiment with another identification strategy where I identify a business cycle shock
as one that moves output as well as dividends in the same direction for four quarters following
the shock (Identification TII). Per Mountford and Uhlig (2005), I define the impulse vector with
respect to business cycle shock as under
Definition 1: A business cycle shock impulse vector is an impulse vector a, that minimizes a
criterion function Φ(a), which penalizes negative impulse responses of output (and dividends in
Identification - TII) at horizons k = 0, 1, 2, and 3.
The sign restriction on monetary policy is unambiguously identified as a positive response of
the interest rate and a negative response of the prices for a year following the shock, while being
agnostic about all other variables.
Definition 2: A monetary policy shock impulse vector is an impulse vector a, that minimizes a
criterion function Φ(a), which penalizes negative impulse responses of interest rate and positive
impulse response of general prices and commodity prices at horizons k = 0, 1, 2, and 3.
In our benchmark identification of shocks to loan loss provisions, I impose a sign restriction
only on the impulse response of provisions such that provisions rise for four quarters after the shock
(Identification SI). In another identification strategy, I eliminate the price puzzle by imposing the
restriction that prices decline for four quarters after a provisions shock in line with the available
results from New Keynesian DSGE models (Identification SII). We are, however, agnostic about
the response of output, dividends and share prices to a provisions shock.
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To identify backward provisioning, I follow a threefold identification strategy. Under Identification-
BI,I impose the minimum restriction that impulse response of provisions be positive. Under Iden-
tification strategy-BII, I impose a negative sign restriction on non-performing assets and a positive
restriction on provisions response. Finally, under Identification - BIII, I impose additional restric-
tion on domestic and commodity prices such that the price responses be negative following a shock.
Per Mountford and Uhlig(2005), I define the following
Definition 3: A provisioning shock impulse vector is an impulse vector a, that minimizes a
criterion function Φ(a), which penalizes negative impulse responses of provisions (and positive
impulse responses of prices (Identification-SII) at horizons k = 0, 1, 2, and 3.
I use three different types of sign restrictions to identify dynamic provisioning shocks. The idea
is that dynamic provisioning shocks should be characterised by a rise in loan loss provisions and a
fall in NPAs to total loans which capture the change in identified credit losses. To investigate the
robustness of this idea, I explore three identification schemes - (i) Under Identification-DI, I im-
pose only one sign restriction to identify a dynamic provisioning shock that the impulse response
of provisions be positive. Although, it is a minimal set of restrictions, it perfectly identifies the
desired shock. (ii) Under Identification - DII, in addition to the sign restriction on provisions, I
impose the sign restriction on the response of NPAs to total loans to be negative for four quarters
following a provisions shock. (iii) Under Identification - DIII, I impose a positive sign restriction
on provisions, negative restriction on NPAs and a positive sign restriction on impulse response of
prices to a dynamic provisioning shock. The response of prices to a loan loss provisioning shock
is highly circumspect. While the available literature points towards a decline in prices following
a provisions shock, the recursive VAR results indicate that the prices rise following a provisions
shock. Hence I think it is a good idea to check the robustness of the recursive VAR results.
Definition 4: A dynamic provisioning shock impulse vector is an impulse vector a, that min-
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imizes a criterion function Φ(a), which penalizes negative impulse responses of provisions (and
positive impulse responses of NPAs, and NPAs and prices under Identification DII and DIII, re-
spectively) at horizons k = 0, 1, 2 and 3.
In case of provisions shock, I am agnostic about the response of output, dividends and asset
prices in the seven variable case. In the eight variable case, I experiment with different identi-
fication strategies by first imposing a sign restriction on interest rates along with provisions and
prices and then removing the restriction and observing the response of interest rate to a shock to
provisions.
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Table 2.3: Identifying Sign Restrictions




Monetary Policy + (-) (-)
Provisions Shock
(i) SI +




(iii)DIII + (-) (-) (-)
2.8.4 Results
2.8.4.1 Monetary Policy Shock
We first test the standard specification with output, dividends, general prices, commodity
prices, interest rate and share prices in that order which is also similar to the specification in Gali
(2014). The results are in line with the existing literature(Figure A.4). Interest rate shock signif-
icantly reduces commodity prices and dividends after a zero impact response. Prices rise initially
and significantly and decline much more gradually. Share prices respond slowly and then rise over-
time significantly in response to the interest rate shock. And as explained by Gali (2014), interest
rate tightening seems to be enhancing the relative size of the bubble which ends up increasing the
observed asset price over time, due to its positive effect on the bubble more than offsetting the
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negative impact on the fundamental component. However, with sign restrictions, although output
and prices decline significantly, share prices jump upwards on impact, as compared to zero impact
response under recursive VAR (Figure A.5). However, I did not find any evidence with respect
to decline in share prices when I allowed for an endogenous contemporaneous response of inter-
est rate to share prices in recursive VAR. Although it must be mentioned that I did not calibrate
the relevant coefficient in the monetary policy rule according to the findings in Rigobon and Sack
(2003) as Gali(2013) did.
Under sign restrictions, as opposed to the above evidence, an interest rate rule that factors
in provision information, significantly raises stock prices for first two quarters, although with a
standard Taylor rule (interest rate preceding provisions) the share prices decline by the 10th quarter.
Under recursive VAR, however, stock prices rise significantly following an interest rate shock,
both for a standard Taylor rule as well as an interest rate rule that a priori factors in provision
information(Figure A.8 and Figure A.10). Also in the presence of provisions under sign restrictions
approach, allowing for an endogenous contemporaneous response of interest rate to share prices
significantly raises share prices following an interest rate shock.
An asset quality augmented Taylor interest rate rule significantly reduces stock prices within
a quarter, although temporarily. It seems that if interest rate responds contemporaneously to ex-
pected credit losses, a tightening of interest rates may be interpreted by investors as falling financial
system portending tight credit conditions in the future. In other words, both the bubble and funda-
mental component of stock prices may be declining under backward provisioning with augmented
taylor rule.
Under dynamic provisioning with standard Taylor rule, an interest rate shock reduces prices,
dividends and output effectively but raises stock prices significantly. The rise in interest rate ex-
pands the bubble component which in turn raises the stock prices. However, under dynamic provi-
sioning with provisions and expected credit loss augmented interest rate rule, stock prices first rise
immediately and peak by the fifth quarter, and then decline, though gradually but significantly.
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2.8.4.2 Shock to Provisions
In the benchmark identification with provisions, a shock to provisions significantly reduces
stock prices on impact. Output and dividends contract after a zero impact response, while prices
rise only after a prolonged period of non-response but the rise is not statistically significant(Figure
A.6). Under sign restrictions, however, all variables except dividends, prices and provisions whose
impulse response is restricted to be positive, rise significantly (Figure A.7) Further, output, div-
idends and general prices decline significantly on impact as opposed to a zero impact response
under recursive VAR. Commodity prices are sticky and rise significantly on impact and moderate
only after the 8th quarter. Stock prices rise on impact and moderate only after two quarters but the
decline is significant only in the medium run. The spontaneous response of output, dividends and
prices capture the announcement effects of policy variables which take effect after four quarters.
Incorporating interest rates into benchmark specification which may be referred to as the pro-
visions with standard Taylor rule (interest rate precedes provisions), a shock to provisions signif-
icantly reduces stock prices, output and dividends. Interest rates also decline after zero impact
response although not significantly. Prices are sticky downwards but as opposed to the benchmark
identification case with provisions, they rise quickly and significantly and do not turn to zero in
the medium run (Figure 9). There is no difference in the results from augmented Taylor rule where
interest rates respond contemporaneously to output, dividends, prices and provisions (Figure 10).
Taking into account spread between lending rate and policy rate in place of either the lending
or policy rate, a provisions shock leads to gradual and marginal increase in spreads which is not
statistically significant from zero (Figure A.12). With the inclusion of spread, output and divi-
dends decline significantly after initial zero impact response. Following a provisions shock, prices
decline permanently after an initial zero impact response. Introducing credit into the specification
delays the decline in prices. Prices do not respond to provisions shock until the fourth quarter and
thereafter decline significantly and then returns to zero by the 12th quarter (Figure A.13). How-
ever, in all these specifications stock prices decline significantly following a provisions shock.
71
2.8.4.3 Shock to Dynamic Provisioning
Identifying dynamic provisioning shock amounts to fixing the systematic component of loan
loss provisions. I use different identifying strategies to identify the dynamic provisioning shock.
Under identification I, I find that stock prices decline on impact and the permanently following
a dynamic provisioning shock. A shock to asset quality raises provisions immediately and sets
them permanently higher for the next many quarters. Stock prices rise initially following an asset
quality shock but then declines from the third quarter. The response of stock prices to a provisions
shock remains unchanged even if I endogenize the response of provisions to stock prices as under
Identification II. Under sign restrictions, DII , stock price response to a dynamic provisioning
shock is ambiguous. It rises initially and declines intermittently but the response is not statistically
significant from zero. However, under DIII where sign restrictions are imposed on prices and
NPAs, stock prices decline significantly. The response of stock prices to a asset quality shock
is akin to recursive SVAR case. With the provisions shock moderating output, interest rate and
fundamental component of stock prices, tightening of provisions is construed by the stock market
as a future rise in credit losses. Investors factor in those adverse expectations leading to a fall in
stock prices. A dynamic provisioning shock is a leading indicator of downturn in business cycle
emerging in the real sector and gradually cascading to the financial sector.
2.8.4.4 Binning’s and Modified RWZ Approach
Mountford and Uhlig’s (2005) penalty function approach to sign restrictions VAR has been
criticised on more than one occasion. Arias, Ramirez and Waggoner (2014)(henceforth ARW) ar-
gue that this approach introduces sign restrictions in addition to the ones specified in identification
violating proclaimed agnosticism. Hence they tend to generate biased impulse response functions
and artificially narrow confidence intervals around them. They criticize the PFA as it selects a sin-
gle value of structural parameter by minimizing the loss function instead of drawing from the post
war distribution of structural parameters conditional on sign and zero restrictions. ARW(2014)
provide an algorithm that correctly draws from the posterior distribution of structural parameters
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conditional on sign and zero restrictions. However ARW (2014) makes it clear that their objective
is “neither to dispute nor challenge SVAR’s identified with sign and zero restrictions”. In fact
their methodology “preserves the virtues of the pure sign restrictions approach developed by Faust
(1998), Canova and Nicolo (2002), Uhlig (2005) and Rubio Ramirez et al (2010). The RWZ (2010)
deserves a special mention here because of its widescale use in the subsequent work in this field.
The RWZ (2010) established general rank conditions for global identification of overidentified and
exactly identified models. They provided a number of efficient algorithms for small sample esti-
mation and inference. Baumeister and Benati (2013) compute the time varying structural impact
matrix by combining the procedure proposed by RWZ (2010) to impose sign restrictions with the
imposition of a single zero restriction via a deterministic Givens rotation matrix. Benati (2013)
combined the methodology of RWZ (2010) for imposing sign restrictions with the procedure of
Gali and Gambetti (2015) to impose long run restrictions using Householder transformation in a
time varying VAR context.
Binning (2013) argued that PFA method had the advantage that more draws are likely to match
the sign restrictions and the ordering of shocks can be used to weight the significance of the shocks.
However, he also pointed out that because of the recursive solution, results may be sensitive to the
ordering of the shocks. Binning (2013) extended the Rubio-Ramirez, Waggoner and Zha (2008)
(henceforth RWZ) algorithm for imposing short run and long run restrictions on exactly identified
models to underidentified SVAR models. In the following section, I show that how the identifica-
tion strategy mentioned in the previous section can be re-estimated using Binning’s algorithm for
solving underidentifed SVAR combining sign and zero restrictions.
2.8.4.5 Methodology
I try to identify six shocks - provisions shocks, dividend shocks, demand shocks, supply shocks,
monetary policy shocks and news shocks. I base some of my identifying assumptions on the im-
pulse responses obtained from Smets and Wouters (2007) and Gerali et al (2010).I use the follow-
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ing two identification schemes. In the first identification scheme, I assume that dividends, inflation,
GDP and interest rate spreads do not respond to a provisions shock in the short run. In the long run,
provisions shock affects all the variables except GDP. However, I am agnostic about the impact of
provisions shock on stock price in the short run.
On impact, a monetary policy shock reduces inflation and GDP, while I am agnostic about its
impact on provisions, dividends and stock prices. In the long run, monetary policy shock affects
all the variables except GDP.
Aggregate supply shock is the only shock that has a long run impact on GDP, a result that has
been empirically proved by many authors. Aggregate demand shock, on the other hand, raises





















+1 × × × × ×
0 +1 × × × ×
0 × +1 −1 −1 ×
0 × +1 +1 −1 ×
0 × +1 −1 +1 ×
× × × × × ×
× × × × × ×
× × × × × ×
× × × × × ×
0 0 0 × 0 0
× × × × × ×
× × × × × ×

where L0 is the n× n short run impact matrix and L∞ is the long run impact matrix. The
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labels on the rows are the variables viz., loan loss provisions (∆log(ll p)), dividends (∆log(div0)),
inflation (π), GDP (∆log(Y )), interest rate spreads ((iplr− ie f f r)) and stock price (∆log(sp)). The
columns represent the shocks such that the first column is provisions shock, second column is
dividends shocks, third is demand shock, fourth is aggregate supply shock, fifth is monetary policy
shock and sixth is news shock. The zero restrictions on each shock can be written in terms of an
n×2n matrix Q j such that
Q j f (Z,B)e j = 0 (2.48)
Hence, there will be as many Q j matrices as the number of shocks (Binning (2013)). The above
mentioned restrictions translate into the following Q j matrices. If q j = rank(Q j), then columns in
equation are ordered in descending order of rank of corresponding Q j matrices.
Q1 =

0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0




0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0





0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0




0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0




0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0




0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

As suggested by Theorem 1 of RWZ, an SVAR is exactly identified if and only if rank(Q j) =
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n− j for 1≤ j ≤ n. In this particular case, the rank for the restrictions on the provisions shock is
q1 = 5 which is exactly equal to the rank suggested by Theorem 1 of RWZ. Hence the provisions
shock is exactly identified. The rank on the dividends shock is q2 = 1 as opposed to the desired
value of 4, rank on aggregate demand shock is q3 = 1 as opposed to desired value of 3, rank
on aggregate supply shock q4 = 0 as opposed to desired value of 2, rank on monetary policy
shock is q5 = 1. Under specification 2 (AB-Specification-2), I assume that all variables respond to
provisions shock in the short run and inflation rises on impact in response to a provisions shock.
The provisions shock is no more exactly identified under this specification.
2.8.4.6 Results
Under Specification 1, provisions shock is exactly identified. Upon a provisions shock, divi-
dends rise initially and starts declining after the third quarter and then declines permanently. In-
flation rises after a zero impact response, and returns to zero only in the medium run. Interest rate
spreads peak during the second quarter and decline only after the fourth quarter. GDP peaks in the
third quarter and starts declining thereafter before returning to zero. Stock prices rise sharply on
impact and start declining thereafter, reaching a trough during the third quarter before returning to
zero (Figure A.16).
Under Specification 1, a monetary policy shock is set identified. Inflation and GDP decline while
interest rate spreads rise on impact in line with the sign restrictions. However, the impact response
of stock price to a monetary policy shock is ambiguous under sign restrictions, although the stock
prices rise during the third quarter (Figure A.17). This response is different from the stock price
response to monetary policy shock under SVAR, where stock prices increase sharply after a zero
non-response and the rise is statistically significant from zero. This is also different from the re-
sponse under sign restrictions under Mountford and Uhlig (2005) method, where stock prices rise
significantly on impact.
Under Specification 2, inflation increases and GDP declines in line with the sign restrictions im-
posed. The impact response of stock prices to provisions is however ambiguous, although stock
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prices decline in the third quarter (Figure A.18). Inflation and GDP declines in response to a
monetary policy shock, while the response of stock prices is ambiguous (Figure A.19)1
2.9 Conclusion
This paper examines the impact of monetary and macro-prudential policy on asset bubbles
within the framework of a canonical overlapping generations model with monopolistic competi-
tion, price setting in advance and financial frictions. Gali (2014) observed that a leaning against
the wind monetary policy generates a larger volatility in the bubble than a policy of benign ne-
glect. The results of this paper nests Gali’s (2014) remarks that bubble volatility is minimised at
φq = −1 < 0 which is indicative of passive monetary policy. However, it is observed that if the
financial system is sensitive to changes in φ b, lower values of macroprudential parameter leads to
gradual and marginal rise in interest rate spreads, contracting the bubble. But as the macropruden-
tial parameter is tightened beyond a threshold value, bank accumulates provisions which induces
them to assume more risks and hence credit varies positively with φ b above the threshold. The
cost of intermediation impinges on the profitability of banks inducing compensating hike in lend-
ing rates. The abundant liquidity in the economy raises inflation and induces rise in policy rates
and aggravates the volatility in the bubble. In sum, minimisation of bubble volatility necessitates
a passive monetary policy response to the bubble but an active macroprudential policy, bounded
above. It is also observed that stronger interest rate response of monetary policy to the bubble
necessitates a stronger macroprudential response possibly to absorb the excess volatility generated
by the monetary policy.
With respect to monetary policy, there is a conflict between stabilization of current aggregate
demand (through the stabilization of volatility in dividends) and stabilization of future aggregate
demand like Gali(2014). However, optimal macro-prudential policy might not have to strike a
balance between stabilization of current aggregate demand which calls for an increasing cost of
1I express my gratitude to Dr. Andrew Binning for having shared his code with me. The code used is from
his working paper “Underidentified SVAR models: A framework for combining short and long-run restrictions with
sign-restrictions” (2013) and can be found on his webpage.
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intermediation and stabilization of future aggregate demand (bubbles) which requires a strong
macro-prudential response to bubble volatility, at least upto a threshold.
The empirical results verify the ’provisioning cost’ channel. A positive provisions shock
induces an adverse aggregate demand effect due to restricted credit supply and a subdued anti-
inflationary stance of monetary policy leading to gradual rise in interest rate spreads and the con-
traction of bubble component of stock prices. Similar results are obtained with respect to provi-
sions shock with standard Taylor rule or augmented Taylor rule. Using US data, this paper finds
that provisioning shock in general and dynamic loan loss provisioning shock, in particular reduces
stock prices and dampens output growth as opposed to monetary policy. This result is substanti-
ated both under recursive SVAR specifications as well as sign restrictions imposed according to
Mountford and Uhlig (2005) specification. However, by combining sign and zero restrictions in an
underidentified SVAR model proposed by Binning(2013),the paper finds that stock prices decline
when variables are assumed to be responding to provisions shock only in the long run. However,
when sign restrictions are imposed on inflation, impact response of stock price to provisions shock
as well as monetary policy shock is ambiguous. However, stock prices decline during the second
quarter in response to a provisions shock.
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Chapter 3
Financial Inclusion, Financial Stability and
Credit Cycles in EMEs
3.1 Introduction
Financial Inclusion has been the cynosure of global attention for the past couple of years. There
has been a welcome realisation among the international policy making units including the G-20 that
financial inclusion is fundamental to improving the livelihoods of the poor as it enables them to run
their businesses, build assets, smooth consumption and manage risks. From a policy perspective,
there is an equal realisation that financial inclusion improves transmission of monetary impulses
as a greater chunk of economic activity comes under the purview of interest rates (Mehrotra and
Yetman; 2014). Moreover, access to formal savings and credit mechanisms inculcates savings be-
haviour and facilitates investments in productive pursuits like education and entrepreneurship, thus
enhancing growth in human capital and narrowing income inequalities (Kunt and Klapper (2013)).
However, the benefits of financial inclusion notwithstanding, the impact of bank based financial
inclusion on bank’s stability which are the underpinnings of systemic stability has been a relatively
lesser researched area, although there is persistent concern about it. This may partly be attributed
to the scarcity and relative newness of data on financial inclusion and the noblety of the program.
But post financial crisis, it is important to notice how financial innovations like these have been af-
fecting the operating cost of banks and its overall soundness. The question that we are trying to ask
is as banks adopt new methods to accommodate these un-banked set of new consumers, what im-
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pact can we expect on banking stability and overall systemic stability. Access to low cost deposits
may enhance the resilience of deposit funding base of banking sector in times of financial stress
by reducing its dependence on non-core financing and pro-cyclicality risk, a point that has been
well asserted by Hanning and Jansen (2010). In many countries like Peru, banking agents are also
loan collectors that may facilitate better management of non-performing assets. But on the other
hand, one thing that is common in these innovative practices is the intervention of a ‘third party’
either in the form of banking agent or mobile service provider that do not have a prior experience
in handling financial services (BIS, 2015). Although reducing transaction cost for banks, con-
tracting commercial third parties (banking agents) to offer basic financial services on behalf of the
contracted bank endows the bank with operational risks. In many countries like Peru, Colombia,
Mexico Brazil, Pakistan, Fiji and Philippines, banking correspondent agents (BCAs) are involved
in customer due diligence measures (CDD) or primary customer identification required for account
opening and other transactions. However, technological incompatibility with the realities of local
agent locations as well as higher cost of technology operation in low traffic areas (low economies
of scale) restrict the use of sophisticated fool proof technology like biometric identification. This
raises questions about whether financial inclusion may compromise anti-money laundering and
combating financing terrorism efforts (AML/CFT) of Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and
whether these costs override the benefits of financial inclusion (CGAP, 2011). Further, depending
on how policies are framed, the possibility of the system shaping up into an asymmetric financial
inclusion process with higher financial risks where rapid credit growth may not be accompanied
with commensurate growth in deposits cannot be discounted in low income economies. Which of
these two forces may be operative in a financial system depends on a variety of factors including
the quality of regulation.
This paper seeks to enhance our understanding of the role of financial innovations typical of
economies engaged in bank based financial inclusion programs in the course of credit cycles. In
pursuance of this objective, I introduce several financial frictions that capture the dynamics of
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credit supply in such economies in a New Keynesian Stochastic General Equilibrium model. The
paper is organised in the following order. Section 2 elaborates the definitions of financial inclusion
and financial stability and brings out the conflict between the two goals. Section 3 sets out a
literature review on the subject. Section 4 talks about the model, Section 5 is calibration and
Section 6 elaborates the results. Section 7 produces the results of the alternative model. Section 8
Concludes.
3.2 What is Financial Inclusion?
As the United Nations point out, 50 per cent of the world’s total population do not have access
to formal or semi-formal financial services like a bank account, life insurance, savings and payment
options. This section of the population is said to be financially excluded. Based on World Bank’s
Global Findex data and focussing on low and middle income countries exclusively, the distribution
of population concentrated in these countries that do not have even a single bank account is highly
non-gaussian with the average percentage of population that is excluded financially as high as 66.7
per cent (Figure 3.1). To share some glaring facts, the World Bank data on financial inclusion
(Findex 2011) shows that the percentage of population who do not have a bank account may range
between 18 per cent in Mauritius to 99 per cent in Turkmenistan. If we remove one third of the
lowest and one third of the highest observations from the sample, then this data ranges between a
minimum of 63 per cent and a maximum of 79 per cent in the above mentioned set of countries.
Cross section regression estimation based on Global Findex data shows that while females have
less access to finance, access increases with age, education and income. So the youth, females,
illiterate and the poor are more likely to be excluded from the formal financial system (Table 3.1).
Financial inclusion, then, to be precise, is the process of improving the effective access of
working age adults to basic financial products supplied by formal and semi-formal institutions so
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Figure 3.1: Kernel Density of percentage financially excluded in
Middle and Low Income Countries
Table 3.1: Results from Cross-Section Regressions
Variable Coefficient Std.Error P-value
Female 0.1777 0.0081 0.000
Age -0.0074 0.0003 0.000
Education -0.505 0.0069 0.000
Income -0.192 0.0029 0.000
Constant 1.569 0.0898 0.000
as to reduce their dependence on informal financial architecture, which may be exhorbitant and
in some cases, exploitative. Effective access, in turn, involves convenient and responsible service
delivery, at a cost affordable to the customer and sustainable for the provider (BBVA, 2015)
Financial inclusion as well as financial stability are both complex and multidimensional con-
cepts that betray any universal definition. It is extremely difficult to present a comprehensive
measure that appeals to all aspects of financial inclusion or financial stability. Nevertheless, some
attempts have been made to develop such a measure. The GPFI endorsed a basic set of financial
inclusion indicators at the G-20 Los Cabos Summit in 2012. This measures financial inclusion
along three dimensions - (i)access such as points of service or number of e-money accounts (ii)
usage such as number of depositors, borrowers, insurance policy holders per 1000 adults; and (iii)
quality and delivery of financial services. Amidzic et al (2014) have developed a composite index
of financial inclusion that addresses the issue of weighting as well as that of perfect substitutability
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between dimensions. They have used factor analysis to identify financial inclusion dimensions and
assign weights. The composite index is derived from a non-linear aggregation of intermediate di-
mensional indicators and is subsequently used to rank countries. However, it is currently available
only for a handful of countries and is restricted to the period 2009 to 2013. Increasingly, policy
makers are recognizing the importance of evidence-based decision making and the central role of
data and measurement. Data on financial inclusion can enable identification of areas where policy
is most needed, inform program design and policy choice, and facilitate monitoring and evaluation
(IFC Discussion paper, 2011).
The definition of financial stability, on the other hand, range from a narrow focus to a more
broader definition. ECB(2007) broadly defines financial stability as a condition in which the finan-
cial system comprising of financial intermediaries, markets and market infrastructure is capable of
withstanding shocks and the unravelling of financial imbalances, thereby mitigating the likelihood
of disruptions in the financial intermediation process which are severe enough to significantly im-
pair the allocation of savings to profitable investment opportunities. The narrow definition tries to
quantify financial stability by concentrating on the risks and vulnerabilities of the financial sys-
tem and this is ably accomplished by defining financial instability (Gadanecz and Jayaram, 2009).
According to Borio and Drehmann (2009), financial instability is referred to as a set of conditions
that is sufficient to result in the emergence of financial distress/crises in response to normal-sized
shocks which may originate either in the real or financial sector. Ferguson(2003) refers to finan-
cial instability as any situation where some important set of financial asset prices seem to have
diverged sharply from fundamentals; and/or market functioning and credit availability, have been
significantly distorted, domestically and/or globally; resulting in deviation of aggregate spending
significantly from the economy’s ability to produce. But as Borio and Drehmann (2009), point out
that most definitions of financial stability have three common components - focus on the financial
system as a whole, measure economic welfare and costs in terms of real economic activity and
define it in terms of its opposite, financial instability which is more concrete and observable. In
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this connection, many authors have also tried to develop a composite index of financial stability.
A recent work in this context is the work of Karanovic and Karanovic (2015) who developed a
financial stability index for the Balkan region by juxtaposing the IMF Financial Soundness and
macro-prudential Indicators with World Bank development indicators and CESifo measures of
World economic climate. They perform a Chanut-Laroque analysis of contribution to volatility
levels in the aggregate stability index in order to explore which sub-indices explain the movements
in the index value during the crisis period.
Financial inclusion can promote financial stability on many occasions. For example, correlated
deposit withdrawals could be mitigated if bank deposits are diversified or greater share of adult
population use bank deposits. Thus broader financial inclusion in bank deposits could significantly
improve resilience of banking sector funding and thus overall financial stability (Cull et al; 2012,
Han and Melecky; 2013). Banking agents, by ensuring deposit growth, can thus promote finan-
cial stability. Morgan and Pontines (2014) find some evidence that an increased share of lending
to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) aids financial stability, mainly by reducing non-
performing loans (NPLs) and the probability of default by financial institutions. Also, financial in-
clusion and financial stability can be at loggerheads with each other at many ends. For example, in
some cases the agents are entrusted with the job of customer verification at remote locations where
the use of sophisticated instruments like biometric verification is difficult. Employing inexperi-
enced agents without foolproof instruments can compromise the goals of anti-money laundering
and combating of financing terrorism efforts at the global level. Financial inclusion may lead to
rapid credit growth without expected growth in deposit base, triggering what we call in this paper a
process of ’asymmetric inclusion’ problem. Further, financial inclusion can be made possible only
under a financially stable environment.
Given these significantly large numbers of financially excluded across the world, it is not sur-
prising that in the last one decade, financial inclusion has acquired global attention. Overtime,
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there has been a welcome realisation among the international policy making units including the
G-20 that financial inclusion is fundamental for improving the livelihoods of the poor as it enables
them to run their businesses, build assets, smooth consumption and manage risks. The G20 mem-
bers have adopted Financial Inclusion Action Plan as a part of the financial sector reform agenda.
The Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion (GPFI) was officially launched in December 2010
to institutionalize and serve as the inclusive platform for peer learning, knowledge sharing, pol-
icy advocacy and coordination among G-20 and non-G-20 countries on financial inclusion. The
topic of financial inclusion is increasingly becoming important to global standard setting bodies
for reasons ably summarized by Caruana (2012). As Caruana (2012) points out, policy makers
are becoming acutely aware of the close nexus between financial inclusion, equitable growth and
a stable financial system. Implicit in this awareness is the appreciation of the fact that financial
exclusion is fraught with risks and costs to financial integrity given the fact that cash based world
of financially excluded is less transparent adding to financial instability. Above all, there is an
equivalent appreciation of the fact that innovation is a seminal aspect of financial systems sup-
portive of equitable growth which in turn can bring unprecedented risks emerging from products,
services and providers reaching services to the financial excluded population. The recently issued
Basel III regulations thus also devoted a chapter to financial inclusion. In other words, there is no
gainsaying financial inclusion is going to shape the structure of global policy making in the years
to come.
In pursuance of the international recognition of the issue, there have been considerable efforts
at the individual country level to work towards financial inclusion. The enthusiasm is substantiated
by a recent survey results of the BCBS which finds that 63 per cent of the low income respondents
had a national financial inclusion strategy and most of them have a financial inclusion mandate or
goal at the organisational or national level (BIS, 2015). Countries, who have a weak financial in-
stitution base like Honduras, El Salvador and Nicaragua have preferred to work towards financial
inclusion by allowing micro finance institutions into the policy space. Another set of countries
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like Brazil, Mexico, India, Colombia, Kenya, Philippines, Peru and Turkey which had a reason-
able bank outreach have taken to the route of bank led financial inclusion which includes opening
bank branches in un-banked areas, branch less banking by allowing banking correspondents where
banks have representatives who operates transactions outside the bank’s branch network, allowing
no frills deposit accounts, relaxing KYC (Know your customer) norms and financial literacy pro-
grams and above all digital banking practices.
In this paper, I particularly focus on bank based financial inclusion. I consider two different
credit cycle models imbued with various characteristics typical of an economy adapting to financial
inclusion viz., disutility from bank deposits, loan default and banking correspondent agents inter-
mediating between the bank and the household to reduce the costs of transiting. The first model
characterises BCAs as intermediaries between the bank and the households and indulge only in
cash in and cash out type of transactions. In the second model, BCAs are business facilitators and
employed by the bank as loan advisors who are involved in the life cycle of the loan beginning
with its paperwork, sanction, advising for productive end-use and their smooth repayment. To mo-
tivate the BCAs role as business facilitator, I model the BCAs as forward looking economic agents
supplying their labor to the bank. The bank utilises BCA labor in a linear technology to influence
the repayment rate along with two endogenous stochastic processes, technology shock and BCA
productivity shock. I also assume that the BCAs exercise some market power and model them
as monopolistic competitors. In other words, BCAs serve as bank products retailers that upgrade
the product in terms of its specific features (access,price) and then sell them to households with a
mark-up over the purchase price. I observe that a 100 basis point rise in mark-up rates of loan dis-
bursing BCAs leads to an immediate 50 bp rise in the interest rate charged on consumption loans
to impatient households in the second model. However, equilibrium loans to impatient households
seem to be relatively inelastic with respect to the interest rate. They fall within the quarter but
rise thereafter. The low default rates on loans which the bank ensures by employing the BCAs as
facilitators in the loan life cycle sustains the demand for the loans despite rising interest rates. In
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other words, BCAs working closely with the households in loan management imbibes confidence
among both the households and banks about proper loan disbursal and recovery streamlining the
credit cycle. In the first model, on the other hand, default rates are determined by exogenous pro-
cesses and the BCAs provide price incentives to impatient households to recover the outstanding
loan amount. In this model, a one standard deviation shock to mark up on loan disbursing BCA
units propagates slowly to the interest rates charged on households as initially the adjustment cost
of changing rates exceeds the benefits from higher interest rates as loan demand declines drasti-
cally. The impact of a positive shock to mark-up, however, is very concentrated in both the models.
Aggregate consumption, deposits, asset prices and loans to firms continue to rise, while NPA ratio
declines. However, in the first model, NPA ratio falls because of sharp decline in loans to impatient
households, while in the second model, NPA ratio falls due to rise in repayment rates attributable
to the greater involvement of the BCAs in the loan cycle. In sharp contrast, a positive shock to
mark-up on loan recovery service charges leads to an across the board rise in interest rates which
have a contractionary impact on all real variables. Default rates, however, rise since banks use
the BCAs only as intermediaries to collect loan repayments but not as active participants in loan
recovery.
3.3 Literature
Economic literature in the past have tried to model ’financial exclusion’- although the litera-
ture abstained from phrasing the term - in the framework of Limited Asset market participation
where a section of private agents are not forward looking optimising agents. So they do not par-
ticipate in the asset market to smooth their consumption, instead, in the words of Mankiw(2000),
they live from ’paycheck to paycheck’. Gali (2003) built on Mankiw’s model and observed that
allowing for ‘rule of thumb’ consumers in DSGE models produces closer fit of models results to
data, a phenomenon which was not observed with the canonical models with government spending.
Mehrotra and Yetman (2014) showed that optimal monetary policy implies a positive relationship
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between the share of financially included households and the ratio of output volatility to inflation
volatility. Among the two notable empirical studies in this area, Han and Melecky (2013) indicate
that a 10 percent increase in the share of people that have access to bank deposits can mitigate
the deposit growth drops (or deposit withdrawal rates) by about three to eight percentage points.
The enhanced resilience of bank funding can then support overall financial stability of the banking
sector and the entire financial system. They also found that this effect is likely to be much stronger
in middle-income countries, which could face greater shocks to depositor confidence due to still
developing trust in the banking sector and already high integration in global finance. Morgan and
Pontines (2014) find some evidence that an increased share of lending to small and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs) aids financial stability, mainly by reducing non-performing loans (NPLs) and
the probability of default by financial institutions. This suggests that policy measures to increase
financial inclusion, at least to SMEs, would have the side-benefit of contributing to financial sta-
bility as well.
My work deviates from all the other work in two major aspects. First I focus on ’financial
inclusion’, rather than ’financial exclusion’. Second, the past literature treats the subject as a de-
mand side problem, while I am trying to look at the issue from the supply side. I am trying to
study the dynamics of an economy where providing finance to nook and corners of the economy
may not be a cost effective option even for a well-regulated bank through conventional ’brick and
mortar’ banking. So while my study puts ’finance’ at the centre stage of economic growth of both
rural and urban economy as opposed to the view of Modigilani and Miller, it also highlights that
financial innovations to reach out to the masses may bring additional dynamics into the economy.
To the best of my knowledge this is the first paper which focusses on bank based financial in-
clusion and models the banking correspondent agents in a New Keynesian DSGE model. This
paper relates to a wide body of literature that builds financial frictions into dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium model. The widely used financial accelerator model of Bernanke, Gertler
and Gilchrist (1999) (henceforth BGG) introduces frictions through agency costs by assuming a
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variant of Townsend’s ’costly state verification’ where lenders pay a auditing price for observing
the realized returns of borrowers. Costly verification introduces an inverse relationship between
external finance premium and net worth of potential borrowers. The procyclicality of net worth
and the ensuing countercyclicality of external finance premium leads to fluctuations in economic
activity. Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) added muscle to BGG theory by looking at shocks to net
worth emerging from changes in values of firm’s assets and liabilities. They argue how persistent
shocks can have a cumulative impact on asset prices, net worth of borrowers and through that on
economic activity. Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) assumes away ex-post default as borrowers are re-
quired to pledge a collateral that eliminates the incentive to default. In contrast, Dubey (2005) and
Lin (2014) model default in equilibrium and default is costly to lenders. They assume that bor-
rowers are subject to non-pecuniary default penalties where the borrower loses reputation owing
to default and pecuniary default penalties in the form of search costs of new loans after default.
Iacoviello (2005) asserted that the strength of financial accelerator may not be uniform depending
on the origin of shocks. While a demand shock may accelerate asset prices and consumer prices
leading to higher overall spending, higher consumer prices may dampen adverse supply shocks if
obligations are held in nominal terms. As opposed to the dynamics of market finance, a number of
papers look at the financial frictions in institutional credit. Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2010)
(henceforth CMR) and Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) study the demand side of bank credit in
a perfectly competitive banking market set up. On the other hand, Gerali et al (2010) examines the
impact of supply side financial frictions on economic activity. They introduce a monopolistically
competitive retail banking structure where interest rates are sticky and adjusted only infrequently.
They find that shocks emerging from the banking sector explain the bulk of the contraction in eco-
nomic activity. Sticky interest rate attenuate the effects of monetary policy shocks and financial
intermediation increases the propagation of supply shocks.
This paper is closer in structure to Gerali et al (2010). But I use two types of default modelling
strategies to highlight the economic situations of assetless borrowing households and asset owning
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borrowing entrepreneurs. The rest of the description of the paper is produced under the model
section. But prior to presenting the models, I present some empirical results based on difference in
difference estimation.
3.4 Empirical Work
I contribute to this growing literature by exploring the relationship between financial inclusion
and stability in countries adopting banking correspondent model. I look at how financial inclu-
sion through banking correspondence agents impacts the non-performing assets and z-score of the
banks in such countries. A graphical comparison of non-performing assets to gross loan ratios in
countries adopting banking correspondent model as opposed to others show that the latter share a
similar trend but have a higher NPA ratio and the gap widened during the current financial crisis
(Figure 3.2). The graphical inference although consistent with existing literature raises important
pointers as to how adopting banking correspondent model bears an ameliorative impact on bad
assets of a financial system. Is it the efficiency of the third party agents in introducing the right
customer to the bank and continued efforts on their part in monitoring these customers that has
lowered bad asset formation? Or is it that only countries which had a strong NPA management
system took to financial inclusion through bank based programmes which in turn makes the finan-
cial inclusion variable an endogenous variable. My paper is an improvement on many previous
papers that have tried to assess the impact of various factors on NPA generation in general, and the
impact of financial inclusion on NPA creation, in particular. Unlike Beck et al (2012), I control
for management of non-performing assets by various categorical variables that capture the asset
classification differences across countries. I abstain from using any ratios in our model unlike Mor-
gan and Pontines (2014) because ratios introduce an automatic bias in the models and may lead
to misinterpretation of data. Further all these studies allow specification bias by assuming a linear
relationship between financial inclusion and stability. I test for various spline fits in my study and
also discover non linearity in many variables.
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Figure 3.2: Average NPAs - Economies with Banking Correspondent vs Economies without Bank-
ing Correspondent
3.4.1 Identification Strategy
I approach to estimate the causal effect of financial inclusion on financial stability in three
stages. One, at the country level where I use a difference in difference estimator to identify the
causal effect of financial inclusion in ten countries where bank led financial inclusion has been
introduced between 2001-2013.
N pait = α +δi + γt +β ∗FI +θ ∗Z(it)+ εit
Where i denotes countries, t denotes years, δi captures country fixed effects, γt are year fixed
effects, FI stands for dummy for financial inclusion which is the interaction term between the year
the policy was introduced in the treatment country and a dummy that equals one for countries
that had bank led financial inclusion (treatment) and that equals zero for all other countries in our
sample, Z(it) are control variables that include log private credit to GDP ratio, a variable that prox-
ies the quality of regulation in each country and average assets to equity ratio (leverage ratio) of
microfinance institutions in countries. The latter is calculated by subtracting the Basel norm for
capital adequacy from the existing capital adequacy for each country. At the second stage, I use the
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Indian bank level data on non performing assets (Npa), advances (log_adv), capital adequacy ratio
(logcrar) and interest income (logint_inc) to assess the impact of financial inclusion on stability. In
2005, the Reserve Bank of India issued circulars to all scheduled commercial banks to introduce fi-
nancial inclusion plans. Only public and private sector banks were subject to this policy (treatment
group) while foreign banks were excluded (control group). So we can expect to see a differential
impact of this policy on public and private sector banks relative to the control group which are the
foreign banks. Out of a total of 71 scheduled commercial banks in India, 46 are public and private
sector banks. India has a consolidated banking system where number of banks are limited but each
bank can open as many branches as it wants under the license of the central bank. As at end-March
2013, there were 105,437 commercial bank branches in India. I try to identify the impact of the
policy on the non performing loans of these banks through differences in differences method for
the period 2003-2013 like in equation (1). I chose India as detailed granular data is publicly avail-
able for India as opposed to other developing countries. The same exercise can be done for other
countries subject to bank level data availability. I also include lerner index as a measure of com-
petitiveness in the financial industry. It is envisaged that a more efficient and competitive financial
system is expected to show up in better management of NPAs and low z-scores. Unlike Beck et
al (2013), I abstain from using share prices and foreign currency denominated loans as a control
variable because my sample concentrates on low and middle income countries many of which do
not have a well-developed capital market or substantial foreign currency lending apart from the
fact that lack of data reporting hinders the use of these variables for our sample of countries.
A crucial step that separates my study from earlier empirical work on financial inclusion is that I
have created categorical variables to capture the country differences in asset classification, diversi-
fication and provisioning, the details of which is appended in the Appendix (Figure B.1 and B.2).
Asset classification or the way the countries define non-performing assets and categorize them into
sub-standard, doubtful and loss categories would have a significant impact on the movement of the
NPA variable. The control group, in this case, are the other middle and low income countries. I
use a panel of 143 countries for the period 2004-2011. I also work out difference in difference
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estimates with respect to many other banking parameters like real loans, deposits, return on assets
and return on equity. Further, I also run difference in difference regressions to assess the impact of
the policy on various macro variables like the savings, consumption expenditure, food prices and
unemployment.
Difference in Difference estimates using a panel fixed effects is a static analysis that allows us to
capture the country-specific effects and the unobservable differences between countries. Using a
panel data approach, one can control for the biases generated by potential heterogeneity and omit-
ted variable problems (Beck et al, 2013). I improvise on this specification by fitting and testing for
various non-linear models including general additive models and semiparametric specifications to
arrive at the ideal model. But before doing this exercise for the panel dataset, as a preliminary test,
I use the cross section data in Findex 2011 and test various linear and non-parametric nonlinear
models to get a better idea of the functional form that defines the relationship between bank Z-
score/NPAs and various financial inclusion measures The assumption needed to guarantee that this
identification strategy is valid is that, in the absence of FI, the average difference between outcome
variables across countries (and banks in stage 2) with and without FI would have been the same
post-introduction as pre-introduction. Following Bruhn and Love (2013), I test this assumption
graphically whether the estimated change in outcome variables in countries (banks) with financial
inclusion coincides with the time of introduction of the policy.
The country level annual data on NPAs, private credit to GDP and capital adequacy ratio have been
obtained from world development indicators which provides a long time series of these aggregates.
Annual data on Indian banks is sourced from the Reserve Bank of India and is publicly available
data.
3.4.2 Results
The results at the country level indicate that financial inclusion had a significant negative effect
on non performing loans. The non performing loans declined by 41.9 per cent in countries that
introduced bank led financial inclusion relative to the control group of countries during 2001-2013.
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Other variables like capital adequacy ratio has the right sign but is not significant in explaining the
variations in NPAs (Appendix Table 1). I work out both fixed and random effects model. The
Haussmann test statistic is -7.34 and we fail to reject the null indicating that there is no significant
difference between fixed and random effects model. In order to test the assumption graphically
whether the estimated change in outcome variables (NPAs) in countries with financial inclusion
coincides with the time of introduction of the policy, we compare the trends of average NPAs in
treatment group and control group of countries for the period 2001-2013 (Figure 3.3). While the
trends in NPA ratios in the two groups are same before introduction of policy, post introduction,
while control group witnesses an increase in average NPA ratios, the treatment group sees a decline
in average NPA ratios.
At the bank level in India, the FI interaction term is not significant in explaining the variations
in NPAs between public and private sector banks (treatment group) vis a vis the foreign banks (con-
trol group) (Table 2), although other factors like quality of regulation (logcrar), credit disbursed
(logadv) and interest income (logintinc) are significantly explaining the change in NPAs. However,
we also worked out the regressions with cost of funds (logcof) as a dependant variable trying to see
if catering to the low income population might have had any impact on the cost of funds for banks
(Table 3). I find that financial inclusion of the unbanked increased the cost of funds by 18.1 per
cent in the treatment group of countries relative to the control group and is significant. However,
given the significant time effects, it’s difficult to have a causal interpretation of the financial inclu-
sion program on non performing loans of banks. Further, the time effects become more negative
over time at least uptil a point, suggesting that some other unobserved process was causing NPAs
to decline.
On the other hand, when categorical variables pertaining to asset classification, diversification
and competitiveness were introduced in the country difference in difference estimation, the im-
pact of financial inclusion on stability becomes less stronger and the direction of the impact also
reverses. It is found that financial inclusion accelerated financial instability as non-performing
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Figure 3.3: Average NPAs - Treatment Group vs Control Group
loans increased by 31.3 per cent in countries adopting bank based financial inclusion, although
the result is not statistically significant from zero (Appendix Table 2). In fact, it is observed that
higher growth of credit (business) and increasing competitiveness of the financial system bears a
statistically significant ameliorative impact on non-performing loans. Moreover stricter the norms
of sub-standard loan classification that the bank observes, higher are the non-performing loans.
To avoid any biased estimates due to misspecification of the functional form, I fitted various
non-parametric models using the World Bank Financial Inclusion data for 2011 which provides
the basic core set of financial inclusion measures for countries. I used these financial inclusion
measures with the existing dataset but restricted the sample to the year 2011 as the financial inclu-
sion measures are available only for that year. As a visual check for functional forms, I plotted the
spline fits for all continuous variables used in the model, some of which are produced in Figure 3.4.
I cross checked the non-linear models against linear, quadratic and logarithmic fits by conducting
Chi square tests to arrive at the optimal model (Table 3.2). As the plots indicate,I find considerable
evidence of real GDP per capita varying non-linearly with respect to most of the dependant vari-
ables including Bank Zscore, NPAs and savings. The bank Z score increases categorically with
the rise in per capita GDP until GDP hits moderately high levels (Figure 3.4). The estimates for
lending rate and percentage adults with accounts are essentially linear.
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Table 3.2: Chi-square Test Results
Linear Quadratic Logarithms
Real GDP growth (rgdp_g) 0.01662 0.01662 -
Real Credit Growth (realloans) 0.1043 0.0328 0.03244
Real Lending-rate (rlendingrate) 0.9891 0.9891 -
Real Exchange rate (rer) 0.007308 0.007308 0.02642
%adults with account 0.9889 0.9889 -
Figure 3.4: Financial Inclusion and Bank z-score
Figure 3.5: Financial Inclusion and NPAs
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3.5 An Overlapping Generations Model
We extend the simplest overlapping generations model proposed by Samuelson(1958) and built
on by Diamond(1965) to understand the long run competitive equillibrium in an economy with
heterogenous agents including agents that opt out of the financial system and then explore the
effects on this equillibrium of introduction of basel regulated banks. Each period t, a population Nt
is born of which α are type I consumers and (1−α) are type II consumers and each live for two
periods. So in any period t, we have Nt young households coexisting with Nt−1 old households.
The economy produces a single consumption good that can be consumed either in that period or
stored for one period. The good can also be used by firms for production of the single good y. An
individual born at time t consumes cit in period t and ci,t+1 in period t+1, i∈ [1,2], where subscripts
refer to the types of consumers. We first consider the decentralised competitive equillibrium.
3.5.1 Type I Agents
Type I agents are assumed to maximize their lifetime discounted utility function given as
u(ci,t)+βu(ci,t+1)
s.t.
c1,t + s1 = ω
c1,t+1 = s1
where β is the subjective rate of time preference. We assume rate of time preference is same
across types but later relax this assumption. The individual works in the first period supplying
inelastically one unit of labor and earning a real wage of ω that is paid in terms of consumption
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good.
3.5.2 Type II Agents
Type II agents are assumed to maximize their lifetime discounted utility function given as
u(c2,t)+βu(c2,t+1)
s.t
c2,t + s2 = ω
c2,t+1 = (1+ rt+1)s2
They lend their savings to the firms for which they are paid a rent of rt . The savings of type
II household enable the generation of capital stock that is used to produce output in combination
with labor supplied by young generation in period t+1.The population grows at the rate n such
that Nt = (1+ n)tN0 (Blanchard and Fischer). Thus the younger generation of type II consumers
constitute the supply side of capital market(Diamond, 1965).
3.5.3 Firms
The firms produce a single good y using a neoclasscical production function technology that
observes Inada conditions. Thus
y = F(K,N),F ′(K)> 0,F ′′(K)< 0.
3.5.4 Optimisation
For simiplicity of exposition, we assume that the functional form of u(.) is logarithmic and
y = kγt . So from first order conditions of the two types of consumers and firms, we have
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1. Type I Consumers:ci,t = f (wt),c1,t+1 = f (wt)
2. Type II Consumers:c2,t = f (wt ,rt+1),c2,t+1 = f (wt ,rt+1)
3. Firms: wt = F(kt)− ktF ′(kt+1),rt+1 = F ′(kt+1)
4. Goods Market Equillibrium:
(i) Output is distributed between consumption of type I agents,consumption in type II agents
and investment.







(ii) Also the savings that are channelled into capital formation is provided by only (1−α).Nt of
the population at any time t. Thus




Equation 1 indicates that larger the number of people that are outside the system, smaller is the
size of capital formed in any period.So exclusion hurts economic growth.
3.5.5 Dynamics and Stability














while 0 < sw < 1, the signs of sr is ambiguous. If sr > 0 and given that
d2 f (kt)
dk2t
< 0, equation 2 is
positive. However, comparing it to the original expression in Samuelson (1965), this is magnitu-
dinally smaller if α is high.So the saving loci in an economy with heterogenous agents is below
the saving loci of an economy with a identical agents which implies that steady state capital in an
economy with limited market participation is lower than that in original samuelson economy.
I extend the canonical model to a heterogeneous agent model consisting of three agents - fi-
nancially included savers and borrowing households and financially excluded households. Suppose
every period, Nt agents are born in the economy of which a proportion α1 agents are financially ex-
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cluded, while α2 agents are savers who deposit an amount dt into the bank and the rest 1−α1−α2
are borrowers that borrow an amount of bt in the economy. Each of these households live for two
periods and the proportion in the population remains constant in each period. I assume that the
financially excluded household consume an amount c11 when young (period 1) and c12 during old
age. They also save an amount s1 in period 1. So financially excluded households maximise
max.log(c11, t)+β rlog(c12,t+1)
subject to
c11,t + s1,t = wt
c12,t+1 = s1,t
Similarly the young savers in the economy distribute their wage income into consumption c21,t




c21,t +dt = wt
c22,t+1 = (1+ rdt+1)dt
101
The first order conditions lead to the following linear relationship between consumption in old
and young age
c22,t+1 = β p(1+ rd,t+1)c21,t
Borrowers maximise the following lifetime utility function
max.log(c31,t)+β ilog(c32,t+1)
subject to
c31,t = wt +bt
c32,t+1 +(1+ rbt+1)bt = 0
I assume there exists a bank which issues deposit liabilities to savers and makes loans to house-
holds (bt) and firms (kt). The bank is subject to regulatory restrictions. One, the bank needs to
maintain a capital to risk weighted assets ratio of at least νb. ω1 and ω2 are the weights assigned
by the bank to production and consumption loan, respectively. In addition, in line with the re-
quirement under Basel III, I assume that the bank needs to maintain a a minimum net financial
stability ratio of 1. According to this regulation, the bank must assign a weight of 95 per cent to
household deposits which are stable and a weightage of 100 per cent to bank capital. Loans to retail
and small business are allotted a weightage of 65 per cent. The banks objective function is given by
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Figure 3.6: Capital Formation under Financial Exclusion
(3.1)
Pt = (1 + rkt )kt−1 + (1− α1 − α2)(1 + rbt )bt−1 − α2(1 + rdt )dt−1 − Kbt πt
− 0.5kkb(K
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Simulation of the model shows that capital formation in the economy steadily declines with the
number of financially excluded (Figure 3.6).
3.6 New Keynesian DSGE Model
We follow the basic structure of Gerali et al (2010), yet we deviate from their model in several
aspects so as to include various financial inclusion features of the economy. The first significant
feature of the paper is to model the institution of banking correspondent agents as a major con-
duit for enabling financial inclusion in bank based systems. I define banking correspondent agents
(BCAs) as producers of three types of services namely, the rural loan distribution services, rural
deposit collection services and interest and principal collection services. For the convenience of
modelling, BCAs can basically be seen as retailers of bank products who are operating with a sem-
blance of market power. In recent years, this assumption has been more close to reality. There has
been an increasing realization that regulatory prohibition on agents charging the customer directly
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for their services or quantitative embargoes on how much banks can charge customers for agents
services can endanger the viability and continuity of branchless banking. In recognition of this, in
some countries like India, Reserve Bank of India has permitted banks to charge reasonable fees to
customers for using agents services after approval of bank’s board (November 2009). On the other
hand, Latin American countries allow banks to charge for agent transactions, but banks abstain
from this measure due to affordability or competitiveness concerns. But in some cases like Tanza-
nia and Philippines, the agents have been allowed to set their own fees (CGAP, 2011). So in this
sense, monopolistic competition amongst BCAs is a fair assumption for the model. The BCA re-
tailers upgrade the product in terms of packaging and branding and finally sell them to households
by applying a mark up over the price at which they bought from the bank. In the benchmark model,
BCAs play the role of intermediaries or a delivery channel between the bank and the household
and involved only in cash in and cash out type of transactions. In an alternate specification, the
BCAs loan payment collectors are also modelled as forward looking economic agents whose labor
services are hired by the banks to influence the repayment rates (default rates). In other words,
banks can assert partial control over the default rates by engaging BCAs who involve themselves
directly with the potential borrowers and collect information towards assessing their loan eligibil-
ity with reference to the local economic environment,household’s historical default position and
current economic status. In some cases, BCAs keep vigil over the end-use of the loan and provide
necessary advisory services to the household to ensure past loan repayment and fresh loan pro-
cessing. This model highlights BCAs as business facilitators in addition to the core traditional role
(Wright et al, 2013)
Secondly, we deviate from most existing models in modelling default. Most of the existing lit-
erature follows Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) who assumes away ex-post default as borrowers are
required to pledge a collateral that eliminates the incentive to default. Following Dubey et. al
(2005) and Lin (2014), I wanted default to exist in equilibrium and costly to lenders as well as
borrowers. However, allowing for endogenous default rates is intuitively incompatible with the
essence of the model as I am talking about impatient rural households that neither have collateral
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to pledge or nor they choose the default rates. Inability to repay loan is often not by choice but
an outcome of technological or weather shocks. So I allow for non-pecuniary default penalties as
in Lin (2014)for the impatient household as they incur reputation risks for not returning the loans.
However, to motivate financial inclusion, I stop short of introducing pecuniary default penalties.
3.6.1 Households
There is a continuum of households of measure one. To ensure that lending and borrowing takes
place in equilibrium, we allow for the existence of three non-identical economic agents - Patient
households and impatient households - and a rural entrepreneur. Patient households consume,
work and acquire financial assets, while impatient households consume, work and borrow from
banks. The entrepreneurs produce a homogenous intermediate good by hiring labor from both
the households. The economic agents are differentiated by their degree of impatience which is
reflected in the discount factors.
Banks issue deposit liabilities that are subscribed by patient households. The Bank provides un-
collateralised consumption loans to impatient households and collateralised loans to entrepreneurs.
The entrepreneurs borrow from the banks against their accumulated housing stock. However,
Banks cannot directly reach the household customers and have to depend on intermediaries to reach
out their services to them. Hence, they coordinate with banking correspondent agents (BCAs)
to facilitate financial services to the households. There are three types of BCAs that coordinate
between banks and households - deposit collectors, loan disbursers and loan collectors. These
banking correspondent agents operate in a monopolistically competitive environment producing
differentiated services. We allow for several sources of nominal rigidities - goods market retailers,




















Figure 3.7: Schematic Diagram of the Model
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3.6.1.1 Patient Households

















t )+(1− εdt )Dt ]
which depends on current individual and lagged aggregate consumption cpt , deposits and hours
worked. He supplies labor to the intermediate goods sector, nht for which they are paid wages w
p
t .
In addition, the household incurs a dis-utility while banking in terms of paperwork required or
labor time sacrificed to access the bank to avail its services. Such customers do not prefer to use
the bank for regular savings but rather to receive government payments or for withdrawals. The
stochastic shock, εdt captures the opportunity cost of banking to the household in terms of wages
lost, lost child care or other important household work. We allow for a preference shock (εz,pt ) and
a labor supply shock (ε l,pt ) in patient households. The household chooses consumption and amount
of deposits which is the only available savings instrument and allocates labor to the intermediate












The household allocates his income from the labor market, gross interest income from deposit
last period and lump-sum transfers which includes dividends from banking correspondent sector
into consumption expenditure, real balances and deposits next period. Additionally, the household
pays a price of xd1 per deposit account that it opens with the bank to the banking correspondent
agent that intermediates between the bank and the household. The first order conditions with re-












































which allows for superficial habit consumption as in patient households and depends on current
individual and lagged aggregate consumption cit , labor supplied to the intermediate good produc-
ers, nit for which they are paid wages w
i
t . In addition, the household incurs a disutility from the












The household distributes its labor income and proceeds from unsecured consumption loans
and transfer payments to repayment of past loans and consumption today. The household has to
pay to the banking correspondent agent to obtain the loans from the bank which include opening
an account with the bank and completing necessary paperwork. Further banks have to make efforts
to recover its loans from the household. Banking correspondent agents are employed to advise and
consult with the household and facilitate their repayment of loans. These agents incentivise the
household to pay off the loans by offering a certain percentage (r̃t) of the loan amount as a relief.
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3.6.2 Entrepreneurs
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which depends on current individual and lagged aggregate consumption cet and utility from



















The entrepreneur allocates the proceeds from his output and loans from the bank into consump-
tion expenditure, repayment of past loans, working capital expenditure and investment into fresh
capital.
In addition to the budget constraint, the rural entrepreneurs are also subject to an endogenous
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The retail goods market is monopolistically competitive. Retail prices are sticky and indexed
to a combination of past and steady state inflation, with relative weights given by ip. If retailers
want to change their price beyond what indexation allows, they incur a quadratic adjustment cost
parametrized by kp. Retailers choose Pt, j so as to maximize








demand schedule derived from consumer’s maximization where εyt is stochastic demand price
elasticity used in Gerali et al(2010).
3.6.4 Banks
Banks produce deposit liabilities and distributes loans to impatient households indirectly through
the loan disbursing BCAs and directly (without BCAs) to entrepreneurs. The Bank has to manage
the capital position. As in Gerali et al, bank capital is fixed in the short run and adjusted slowly
through accumulation of retained earnings. The BCAs are retailers of bank’s savings and loan
products. The deposit collecting BCA collects deposits dpt from patient households (and BCA
loan advisors in model 2) and passes the raised funds to the bank at a rate ri,bt . The BCA loan
disbursers obtain funds from the bank at the rate of Rbt and then differentiates them and sells them
to impatient households by applying a mark-up. The bank combines the deposits with bank capital
to issue loans. The bank, is however, subject to a quadratic cost, quantified by a coefficient kkb
and proportional to outstanding capital, whenever capital to assets ratio deviates from a norm νb,







where jbt are real profits made by banks and δb are resources used up in managing bank’s capital
as defined in Gerali et al. The bank’s profit function may be written as
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Portfolio investment is however constrained by availability of funds.
Bt = Dt +Kt
where B is the total loans, Bt = bt +brt . I use this equation to eliminated from the profit equation
to get the revised profit equation










t − (1+ rdt )bt− (1+ rdt )brt +(1+ rdt )Kt







The bank chooses the amount of loans to maximize the profits which is an unconstrained max-
imization of the above profit equation. The first order conditions yields the following two equations
(1+ rbt )Et f
b
t = (1+ r
d
t )+(R̃t)
bEt f bt − kkb(K/B−ν)(K/B)2




In an alternative model, the price channel between banks, BCAs and households is replaced with
an interest rate channel and an additional economic agent, the loan advising BCAs who are for-
ward looking agents who spend their wage and savings proceeds on consumption expenditure and
deposits in period t, is added. So the bank receives deposits from two sources, the impatient house-
holds and BCAs. Further, as explained above, it is also assumed that with the help of BCAs, the
bank can influence repayment rates. So the bank maximises profits subject to the following linear
constraint.







where zet and z
b
t are two stochastic processes pertaining to total factor productivity and productivity
of BCAs. nbt is the labor supplied by BCAs to banks. The first order conditions are modified
accordingly.
3.6.5 Banking Correspondent Agents
Modelling Banking correspondent agents (henceforth BCAs) is the most important contribution
of this paper. BCAs can be looked as market institutions that lower the cost of reaching banking
services to the masses. I envisage a BCA as producing three potential intermediate service inputs
for the bank - rural loan collection services (L), loan disbursal services and rural deposit collection
services (D).
3.6.5.1 Loan Disbursal Retailers
The retail BCA loan disbursal market is monopolistically competitive. The BCA loan disburs-
ers obtain loan accounts from the bank and then differentiates them and resells them to impatient
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households by applying a mark-up, xd3 . If retailers want to change their price beyond what index-

















demand schedule for BCA loan services by banks
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The retail BCA deposit collection market is also monopolistically competitive. The BCA de-
posit collectors collect deposits from the household at the rate of rdt and resells them to banks at
a rate of ri,bt . If retailers want to change their price beyond what indexation allows, they incur a
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s.t demand schedule for BCA deposit services by banks given by
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3.6.5.3 Principle and Interest Payment Collectors
The retail BCA loan collection market is monopolistically competitive. The BCA loan col-
lectors collect loans from the household by offering them incentives at the rate of (r̃t)b and then
differentiates them and resells them to banks by applying a mark-up. If retailers want to change
their price beyond what indexation allows, they incur a quadratic adjustment cost parametrized by









s.t demand schedule of banks for BCA loan collection services given by
γ
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The central bank sets the policy rate at







where r is the steady state policy rate.
3.6.7 Market Clearing Equations
Goods Market Equillibrium: yt = ct +qkt (kt− (1−δ )kt−1)+δ bKt−1/π
Housing Market Equillibrium: ht = 1
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3.7 Calibration
We set the rural patient household discount rate at 0.9902 to reflect a steady state interest rate
of 4 per cent per annum. The impatient households and entrepreneur discount factor is set at
0.975, each. The share of patient labor and impatient labor in firm output is set at 0.5. The price
incentive/waiver provided by the BCAs to impatient households is fixed at an average of 6 per cent
of the loan outstanding to reflect a mark-up of 5 percent over the policy rate at which BCAs sell
the recovered loan to the banks. The default penalty parameter on the impatient household is set at
9.032 in line with the difference between the price incentive provided to induce repayment and the
adjusted gross interest rate payable on the loan.
The average cost of incurring bank deposits is fixed at 0.3048 to reflect a deposit to GDP ratio
of 0.41 and consumption of patient household to GDP ratio of 0.5. For the banking correspondent
agent, no guidance is available in the literature. The mark-ups in BCA retailing based on market
data available on BCA business. According to sources like ’Microsave’, it costs Rs.15 per trans-
action for opening a deposit account, while the average revenue banking correspondents receive
from banks per account opened is Rs.20. Thus on average, there is a 33 per cent mark up over
the cost price. So we set the mark up in deposit collection market at 1.33 to reflect an elasticity of
BCA deposit substitution of 4.03. The mark-up on loan disbursal services is fixed at 1.2305 so as
to reflect a elasticity of BCA loan substitution at 5.338.
3.8 Results
I first analyze the impact of shocks which are unprecedented and specific to this paper - pos-
itive shocks to disutility attached to bank deposits and stochastic shocks to elasticity of substitu-
tion of deposits, loans and loan collection by banking correspondent agents. This is followed by




Interpreting the Euler equation, a unit standard deviation shock to disutility implies that a pa-
tient household will have to incur a higher sacrifice in period t by saving through bank deposits
not only in terms of utility lost from consumption but also due to negative externalities attached to
commuting to the bank, waiting time, understanding complex bank mechanisms and sundry oth-
ers. To compensate the economic agent for the higher sacrifice, the bank ends up paying higher
deposit interest rate in period t+1 to retain consumer interest in bank saving products which in turn
raises the funding cost for the bank. A shock to disutility from bank deposits contemporaneously
reduces total consumption, deposits and total loans. While loans to firms decline, although loans
to impatient households decline on impact but rise subsequently. In this respect, our results com-
plement the results from Norris et al (2015). In a model with heterogeneous agents distinguished
by wealth and talent, Norris et al (2015) have found that greater financial inclusion (decline in
εd) leads to more efficient allocation of funds to talented entrepreneurs and the ensuing efficient
financial contracts limit the waste of financial frictions leading to higher GDP. There is an across
the board rise in interest rates and non-performing assets. Bank offer higher rates to BCAs to
induce better efforts to recover loans from the households. Capital accumulation and investment
decline permanently and rental rate of capital surge. Bank profits rise as deposit outgo declines
but later profits fall as decline in deposits is offset by decline in loans at a rising deposit interest
rate. Overall, rising disutility from bank deposits, which may be construed as an intensification of
financial exclusion, amount to a contractionary impact on aggregate consumption, output and total
credit in the banking system. It not only reduces the flow of financial capital to productive sector
(firms) but also raises the cost of funds for banks as interest rates rise (Appendix Table B.3, B.4
and B.5).
A one standard deviation shock to mark up on loan disbursing BCA units adversely affects banks
profits as a result of which banks respond by raising more capital and reducing credit exposure to
the impatient household. However, loans now get diverted to the firms leading to higher capital
accumulation, investment and output. Interest on loans decline across the board, while deposit
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interest rates decline. As the higher mark up shock is leverage deluding, non-performing assets
ratio declines improving overall banking stability (Appendix Table B.6 and B.7).
3.8.2 Conventional Shocks
3.8.2.1 Monetary Policy Shocks
Lending rates to firms are even more persistent and rise gradually. A contractionary monetary
policy leads to standard results like decline in wages, aggregate consumption, inflation and output.
But while loans to firms decline on impact as a result of decline in present discounted value of
collateral, the decline is more than compensated by the increase in loans to households raising
total amount of loans disbursed in the financial system. This may be explained within the model.
Higher interest rates encouraged higher deposit flow into the banking system leading to higher total
loans. Increased uncollateralised credit flow to the households is thus a result of declining collat-
eral value and abundant funds with the system. But non-performing assets are rising on account of
the monetary policy shock (Appendix Table B.11, B.12 and B.13).
3.8.2.2 Shocks to Credit Supply - Macro-prudential Policy Shocks
A negative one standard deviation shock to LTV ratio has a contractionary impact on output,
wages and savings. Deposits rise on impact but decline by the fifth period. Total consumption
expenditure declines on impact but recovers and rises steadily soon after. Contractionary macro-
prudential policy particularly affects loans supply to firms despite an increase in the value of col-
lateral. Total loans disbursed increases in line with deposits until the fifth quarter but declines
thereafter. Credit flow to the household sector rises on impact and permanently thereafter leading
to a rise in non-performing assets for the bank. Borrowing needs for the household strengthens
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with declining wages and declining interest rates encourage higher offtake of loans by the house-
hold. Bank profits, however, decline, indicating that the resource outflow due to deposit more than
offsets the accrual from loans. Investment demand slackens and inflation also declines. In sum,
negative macro-prudential shocks a la decline in LTV ratios is pro-inclusion at least from the bor-
rowers side (Appendix Table B.14, B.15 and B.16).
3.8.2.3 Technology Shocks
Figure B:17, B:18 and B:19 presents the responses to a positive unit standard deviation tech-
nological shock, zet . Incorporation of financial inclusion features into the model seems to have
enhanced the endogenous propagation of technological shock as in Gerali et al (2009) as many of
the real variables are displaying higher persistence viz., consumption, deposits, wages and loans to
impatient households exhibit hump shaped behaviour. Higher asset prices induce the entrepreneurs
to demand higher loans from the banks and the latter divert their funds to more secure and collat-
eralised sources. For a given level of penalty parameter, bank passes on the initial spike in deposit
interest rates to rates charged on uncollateralised loans to impatient households. BCAs, in turn
have to offer higher per centage relief to ensure the households are capable of returning the loans.
For a given mark-up, this implies that BCAs demand a higher rate for recovery of loans from the
banks (Appendix Table B.17, B.18 and B.19).
3.9 Alternate Model No. 1
A positive shock to loan rate mark-up on loans to impatient households leads to some interest-
ing observations. A 100 basis point hike in mark-up rate raises interest rate charged on consumer
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Table 3.3: Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Description Value
βr Discount factor for Patient Households 0.9902
βi Discount factor for Impatient Households 0.975
βe Discount factor for Entrepreneurs 0.975
θi Coefficient on Hhd non-pecuniary default penalty 9.032
α Share of Patient Labor in Total Output 0.5
ν Basel Capital to Risk Weighted Assets Ratio Norm 0.09
kd BCA Deposit Rate Adj. Cost 0.5
kb BCA Loan Delivery Adj. Cost 6
kkb Leverage Dev. Cost 10
k f BCA Loan Collector Adj. Cost 10
ip price indexation 0.5
φp Weight assigned to Inflation in MP Equation 1.8
φy Weight assigned to Output in MP Equation 0.2
φr Weight assigned to Interest Rate in MP Equation 0.75
f̄ Steady State repayment Rate of Hhd 0.95
s̄ LTV ratio 0.72
loans by 50 basis points instantly.Higher mark-up motivates increased labor supply by banking
correspondent agents (BCAs) and because of the linear technology connecting BCA labor sup-
ply to repayment rates, there is one to one rise in repayment rates (or decline in default rates).
Loan offtake by impatient households rise but by a small margin after a within the quarter decline.
Banking correspondent agents familiarisation with loan receiving households reduces the problem
of adverse selection and enables them to be involved with the proper end-use of the loan and de-
vise methods for loan recovery in sync with the household. Bank capital, however, declines and
offsets an initial zero impact on aggregate loans resulting in a divergence of actual capital asset
ratios from the norm and raising the marginal cost of technology. The resulting increase in credit
spreads, however, causes banks to reduce interest rates charged to BCAs because of an expected
rise in repayment rates. The banks, however, pass on the rise in cost of higher leverage to its other
set of consumers, the entrepreneurs. Banks charge higher interest rates to firms which peaks only
in the 5th quarter. Credit demand by firms rise initially which also leads to concomitant rise in
asset values in the face of declining loan to value ratios. But demand declines subsequently as
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interest rates start rising and loan to value ratios continue to decline.
3.9.1 Productivity Shock to BCAs
The repayment rate is under the influence of two exogenous stochastic processes - technologi-
cal shock (zet ) and productivity shock specific to BCAs (z
b
t ). A productivity shock to BCAs reduces
loan off-take by impatient households. Total borrowing, aggregate consumption and asset prices
decline. In other words, a positive productivity shock to BCAs has a ’Leverage deluding’ and an
overall moderating impact on aggregate demand. On the other hand, technological shock tends
to raise total borrowings, loan to value ratios, wages and consumption and reduces default rates
with an overall positive impact on aggregate demand. So a technological shock has a ’leverage
inducing’ effect on the economy.
3.10 Alternate Model No. 2
In this model, I evaluate the impact of financial inclusion on banks with stronger performance
indicators in terms of stability. The banks under consideration are Basel III compliant and maintain
a net financial stability ratio (NFSR) of at least 1. This also provides us the leeway to assess the im-
pact of more variants of macro-prudential policy viz., the weights on bank capital and commercial
loans that constitute the NFSR.
Increasing weights on loans to entrepreneurs in the NFS ratio has a significant contractionary
impact on the business cycle. Interest rates on loans to entrepreneurs rise leading to a decline in
offtake of such loans, entrepreneurial consumption declines and output contracts. Profit maximis-
ing banks divert loans to impatient households to retain profits. Profits rise on impact and hence
bank capital also rises in tandem. However, this policy is not stability inducing as NPA ratios rise
as the banks have more household loans in its balance sheet with lower repayment rates. In sharp
contrast, raising conventional risk weights on entrepreneurial loans has an expansionary effect on
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business cycles. Despite a rise in interest rate on such loans, banks continue to supply credit to
this sector. Loans to entrepreneurs generate higher returns than loans to households such that it is
easy to raise capital with the higher profits generated and meet the regulatory requirement. With
conventional capital adequacy requirements, the bank can raise loans to entrepreneurs despite ris-
ing weights and yet prevent the deviation of the capital to risk weighted assets ratio from the norm,
by an offsetting decline in loans to households with lower repayment rates and relatively lower
returns.
Rising weights on deposits in NFSR induces a deviation of the NFS ratio from the norm
prompting profit maximising banks to raise loans to entrepreneurs to reduce deviation costs. Since,
existing deposits earn a higher weightage under the new policy and bank profits are also rising by
raising loans to entrepreneurial sector leading to a rise i bank capital, banks have less incentive
to raise more deposits. Hence deposit rates are decline and consequently deposits also decline.
Aggregate output and consumption increase and NPA ratios decline as banks divert their business
towards the productive sector with assured returns. However, raising weights on deposits in NFSR
has some unintended effects such as lowering loans to impatient households and the consequent
decline in household consumption expenditure.
3.11 Long Run Analysis
What are the long run implications of financial inclusion policy on financial and banking stabil-
ity? Does financial inclusion of the erstwhile unbanked population lead to a secular improvement
of systemic stability?
The results of general equilibrium models provides crucial evidence towards a possible nexus
between financial inclusion and financial stability. The DSGE analysis suggests that financial in-
clusion in the form of higher loans to impatient households through banking correspondent agents
(BCAs) reduces NPAs by accelerating the repayment rate of the households. The log-linear ap-












where ft is the repayment rate, b
p
t is the performing loans, npat is the non-performing loans and
kt is the bank capital. ˆsignifies the log deviation from the steady state and¯represents steady state
values of the respective variables. Positive shocks to loans or repayment rate in the event of higher
financial inclusion leads to compensating changes in NPLs to avoid making dynamic adjustments
to the regulatory capital which in turn is expensive because of the quadratic costs of deviation from
the international norm of capital to risk weighted assets ratio (9 per cent as per Basel II) or the net
stable funding ratio (of at least 1 under Basel III).
This discussion leads us into two analytical directions and related empirical examinations. One,
is there a common stochastic trend that underlies the fluctuations in credit to the domestic sector,
non-performing loans and bank provisions as suggested by general equilibrium models. We test
this hypothesis by examining the cointegrating relationship between credit, non-performing loans
and provisions made by banks. We find significant cointegrating relationship between the relevant
variables in 24 of the 29 countries surveyed. Most countries implementing bank based financial
inclusion measures exhibited cointegration among credit, NPLs and bank provisions and witnessed
a decline NPLs following a shock to inclusion.
Two, can we identify more than one permanent shock that might be underlying the fluctua-
tions in these variables? It is very likely that credit and non-performing loans (NPLs) respond to
permanent shocks to productivity as demand for credit generally tends to be higher during output
booms and increasing values of collateral during boom phases may also ensure that banks and
financial institutions are more willing to lend during these phases. But apart from productivity
shocks, credit is also likely to respond to financial inclusion policy shocks. The concept of finan-
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cial inclusion might have been coined a decade ago, but the concept is thriving in letter and spirit
since years. Commercial banks in India, for example, began concerted efforts towards connecting
with the masses by eliminating moneylenders and intermediaries soon after independence in 1947.
Since 1970s, banks have been following priority sector lending targets to ensure that adequate in-
stitutional credit flows to the vulnerable sectors of the economy. Under this policy 40 per cent of
the total adjusted net bank credit of the commercial banks must be channelled to the priority sector
which includes the agriculture sector, micro enterprises and weaker sections. In other words, finan-
cial inclusion is a part and parcel of the credit policy of developing countries. Given that financial
inclusion is an integral part of credit policy, we hypothesise that credit is also likely to respond
positively to cumulative effects of permanent shocks to inclusion. Non-performing loans, on the
other hand, are more likely to decline with higher output periods and higher credit/inclusion but it
also responds positively to cumulative effects of permanent shocks to asset quality. In a standard
VAR model with manufacturing output to GDP ratio, share of credit to domestic sector in total
credit and non-performing loans as a proportion of total credit, we impose three (n(n−1)/2) long
run restrictions to identify these permanent shocks
1. Manufacturing output to total output responds to permanent shocks to productivity but do not
respond to shocks to inclusion and shocks to asset quality in the long run. This assumption
is in line with the popular literature. Blanchard and Quah (1989) and King et al (1991) found
strong evidence that output responds to supply side disturbances in the long run.
2. Credit to domestic sectors do not respond to shocks to asset quality in the long run.
The VAR with long run restrictions produces mixed results. We do not find statistically sig-
nificant evidence that non-performing loans decline in response to permanent inclusion shocks.
Instead, we find that NPLs decline permanently in response to cumulative productivity shocks and
the response is statistically significant from zero. The only exception is the case of Malta where in-
clusion shocks permanently depress NPLs, although the response is not statistically significant. In
some instances like Malaysia and Philippines, we also find evidence that NPLs have significantly
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and permanently risen following financial inclusion shocks.
The paper is divided into the following sections. Section 1 describes the data and data sources.
Section 2 elaborates the unit root tests. Section 3 describes the Johanssen Cointegration tests,
identifying restrictions tests and results and impulse response analysis under VECM. Section 4
illustrates the VAR with long run identification under instrumental variable method along with the
results. Section 5 summarises the paper.
3.12 Data Source
We collect quarterly data on credit to other domestic sectors as a proportion of total credit
disbursed (HH), non-performing loans to total loans(NPL), regulatory Tier-1 capital as a ratio of
risk weighted as a measure of bank provisions(TIER-1-Capital), return on assets (ROA), return on
equity (ROE) and share of manufacturing in GDP for 27 countries. The sample size and period of
analysis varies according to the country under discussion and is provided in Table 1. All data has
been sourced from the Financial Soundness Indicators (FSI) and International Financial Statistics
database of the IMF.
3.13 Unit Root Tests
We follow the method illustrated in Bullard and Keating (1995) in conducting the unit root
tests. We apply augmented Dickey-Fuller tests to check for unit roots in all the time series for
each country. We run two sets of five regressions for each variable. The first five are run with
a constant and 0,1,2,3 and 4 lags and the second set of regressions are run with a constant and a
deterministic trend and 0,1,2,3 and 4 lags. The adjusted Box-Ljung Q test statistic is calculated
for serial correlation of orders 1,2,3 and 4 in each regression. Beginning with the results with the
maximum lag, we proceed sequentially reducing the lag length by one if the Q-statistics is not
significant at the higher lag.
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3.14 Cointegration
If financial stability is predominantly affected by financial inclusion, it is very likely that credit,
non-performing assets and bank provisions would share a long term cointegrating relationship. To
test for all possible relationships, we divide the related variables into two blocks. In the first block,
we test whether financial inclusion shock/credit shock is transmitted to non-performing loans and
bank provisions.
The transmission channels are tested using a vector error correction model as relations are ex-
pected to follow a short term dynamics around possible stable long run equilibrium path. The
specification are tested by changing the recursive order to ensure the system is not sensitive to a
particular ordering.
The next step is to examine the co-integration properties of the set of variables for modelling
them in VECM framework. The test statistics (λTrace,λMax) for testing null hypothesis that the
number of co-integrating vectors r = i against the alternative hypothesis that r ≤ i are presented in
the Appendix Table 1 and 2.
In the next step, we used a parsimonious vector error correction model for an nx1 vector of I(1)
variables.
∆xt = c+ΠXt−1 +Λ∆xt−1 + et (3.4)
The equilibrium properties of the above equation are characterized by the rank of Π. If the
elements of zt are I(1) and co-integrated, Π can be decomposed into two nxr full column rank
matrices α and β , where Π =αβ
′
, this implies that there exist r < n stationary linear combinations
of zt , such that ζt = β
′
zt distributed as I(0). The matrix of adjustment coefficients, α , measures
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Table 3.4: Cointegrating Vector
Country Normalised Coefficients Country Normalised Coefficients
Angola [1 Papua N.G [1
1.926(5.749*) -1.279 (-7.513*)
7.546 (3.000*)] 1.714 (7.705*)]
Armenia [1 Poland [1
-1.162’(-6.930*) 4.052 (3.986*)
-1.153 (-7.309*)] 2.704 (1.798*)]
Bosnia [1 South Africa [1
-0.105 (-3.831*) 0.459 (8.402*)
0.795 (3.443*)] 0.737 (2.656*)]
Brazil [1 Trinidad [1
0.566 (5.742*) -0.009 (-0.197)
-0.624 (-4.103*)] -1.558 (-12.346*)]
India [1 Uganda [1
0.012 (0.578) 0
0.841 (3.413*)] 14.323 (7.112*)]
Kazakhstan [1 Ukraine [1
0 0.128 (7.535*)
2.105(6.968*)] 0.132 (2.980*)]
Kenya [1 Turkey [1
-0.052(-0.916*) 0
-0.459 (-1.368)] -1.222 (78.913*)]
Lesotho [1 Panama [1
-5.561 (-3.075*) -0.071 (-0.547)
10.028 (1.607)] -1.952 (-4.745*)]
Lithuania [1 Nicaragua [1
0 -0.063 (-1.165)
0.073 (1,049*)] 1.099 (3.055*)]
Malaysia [1 Mauritius [1
-0.009 (-0.546) -0.003 (-0.027*)
0.017 (0.180)] -2.461 (-3.437*)]
Malta [1 Hungary [1
-0.252 (-4.017*) 0.089 (1.498)
0.001 (0.008*)] -0.555 (-1.751)]
Peru [1 Romania [1
0 0
-0.876 (-3.887*)] -0.306 (-4.844*)]
t-statistics in ()
how strongly deviations from the long-run equilibrium, ζt , feed back into the system (Das and
Manna, 2009).
The normalised coefficients of the cointegrating vector are produced in Table 1 below. The
financial inclusion channel cointegration result shows that credit to domestic sector is strongly
coupled with non-performing loans and is significantly contractionary in the long run with respect
to Angola, Brazil, Poland, South Africa and Ukraine. The sobering impact on NPLs also prompts
banks to adjust regulatory Tier 1 capital downwards, the only exception being Brazil where provi-
sions rise even with a decline in NPLs
127
3.14.1 Identifying Restrictions
We test for identifying restrictions on the cointegrating vector and the adjustment coefficients
of the error correction equation by setting up a likelihood ratio test statistic. There are several
possible restrictions: restrictions on the rank of the long run matrix, restriction on the long run
cointegrating vector, restriction on the short run dynamic coefficients and restrictions on loading
parameters. However, it is difficult to apply all of them given the limitations of the sample size as
the interaction of dynamic and long run parameters has a profound impact on the size and power of
the tests. So, we apply two types of tests. One, we test for normalisation of coefficient with respect
to the dependant variable in the long run cointegrating vector β matrix with the null hypothesis
H0 : B(i, j) = 1
Two, we also test for the significance of the adjustment coefficients A(i, j) with respect to the
error correction terms pertaining to each equation.
H0 : A(i, j) = 0
The results of these tests are reported under Table 2. The results of the constrained vector error








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The remaining step of the exercise involves examining the sign and pattern of impulse re-
sponses of the relevant variables in reaction to one standard deviation cholesky shock to other
relevant variables. Simple analytics show that out of the 29 countries surveyed for cointegration
between credit to domestic sector, non-performing loans to total loans and bank provisions in the
form of regulatory Tier-1 capital, 24 countries exhibited cointegration and a long run relationship
between the relevant variables. No evidence of cointegration was found in Georgia, Ghana, Philip-
pines, Tajikistan and Thailand.
In Panel A (Appendix Table B.20 and B.21), we present the impulse response results of 8
countries - Bosnia, Brazil, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Romania, Trinidad and Ukraine - that
exhibit cointegration and where non-performing loans declined permanently following an inclu-
sion shock. Within this, the case of Bosnia and Ukraine are particularly interesting where credit
explained 15.7 per cent and 10 per cent of the variations in NPLs in the same quarter, respectively.
The per centage share of the variations explained by NPLs increased to 42 per cent by Q4 and
further to 53 per cent and stabilised at that level by Q8 in the case of Ukraine. For Bosnia, the
share increased to 21 per cent by Q4 and then stabilised at 26 per cent by Q8. Contrastingly, for
Hungary and Kazakhstan, credit explained substantial variation in NPLs only in the longer run. In
the case of Kazakhstan, variations in NPLs were largely explained by shocks to NPLs until Q5 and
then the share of variations explained by credit jumped from 3.5 per cent in Q5 to 53 per cent by
the end of Q10. The other interesting instance is presented by Brazil and Romania, both popular
for their financial inclusion initiatives through the banking system. Although credit explained a
considerable per centage of the variations in NPLs, a substantial share of the variations was also
explained by shock to provisions. In the case of Brazil, credit and provisions explained 25 per cent
and 35 per cent of the variations in NPLs, respectively by Q8, while in the case of Romania, credit
and provisions explained 31 per cent and 26 per cent of the NPL variations by Q8, respectively.
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In Panel B (Appendix Table B.22), we present the case of 5 countries - Angola, India, Lithuania,
Poland and South Africa - where non-performing loans rose initially and then declined on average
after 1-2 years. In India, non-performing loans rise initially but starts declining after Q4, while
in Lithuania and Poland, the decline starts after Q8 despite an initial rise. In South Africa, the
decline in NPLs sets in as early as Q3. Of particular interest is the case of India which has been
implementing bank based financial inclusion measures for a considerable period of time. Credit
explained 30 per cent of the variations in NPLs in the same quarter and this share increased to
38 per cent by Q8. For Angola and Poland, provisions and not credit explained the bulk of the
variance in NPLs.
Panel C (Appendix Table B.23) records the results of 9 of the 24 countries where NPLs rise
permanently following a one standard deviation shock to credit. This includes countries like Turkey
and Peru where bank based financial inclusion is taking roots. In the case of Peru, credit explained
52 per cent of the variations in NPLs in the same quarter and this share graduates to 66 per cent
by Q8 and stabilises permanently at that level. Variations in NPLs in Turkey, on the other hand, is
largely explained by its own shocks. The case of Armenia is special as NPLs decline initially but
start increasing from Q6 and then rise permanently.
3.15 VAR with Long Run Restrictions
We use the Shapiro and Watson (1988) and Fisher (2006) model of long run VAR with IV
method for the estimation of long run multipliers.
Consider a structural VAR model
A0zt = A(L)zt−1 + εt (3.5)
where A0 is a matrix with ones in the diagonal, A(L) is a matrix of lag polynomials, zt is a nX1
vector with elements zt = [m f g−gd pt ,∆ht ,∆npat ] where m f g.gd pt is the log of manufacturing to
GDP ratio, ht is the log of credit to domestic sector and npat is the log of ratio of non-performing
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loans to total loans, εt is the vector of exogenous shocks with a variance covariance matrix given
by Eεtε
′
t = Σ where Σ is a diagonal matrix. The moving average representation of structural errors
is given as
zt =C(L)εt (3.6)
where C(L) = [A0−A(L)]−1 or C(L)[A0−A(L)] = I is an identity matrix.
The first equation in the equation system (1) is given as
m f g.gd pt = ayy(L)m f g.gd pt−1 +ayh(L)∆ht−1 +ayn(L)∆npat + εyt (3.7)
where ai j(L)’s are the relevant lag polynomials. Equation implies that the contemporaneous
effects of all non-εyt shocks influence m f g.gd pt through ∆ht and ∆npat . But according to assump-
tion 1, long run multipliers from these variables to the manufacturing GDP (mfg.gdp) are zero. As
per Fisher (2006), imposing this restriction can be interpreted as imposition of unit root in each of
the lag polynomials associated with ∆ht and ∆npat . This in turn implies that ai j for j=h, npa can
be written as ay j = ây j(L)(1−L). Substituting this into equation yields
m f g.gd pt = ayy(L)m f g.gd pt−1 + âyh(L)∆2ht + âyn(L)∆2npat + εyt (3.8)
Since disturbances to m f g.gd pt affect the contemporaneous values of ∆ht and ∆npat , although
it is orthogonal to all variables dated t-1 and earlier, this equation can be estimated by instrumental
variable method using N lags of zt as instruments. The residuals of this equation denoted as ε̂yt are
stored to be used as instruments for estimation of later equations.
Assumption 2 implies that long run multipliers from ∆npat to ∆ht are zero. This helps us to es-
timate equation sequentially with N lags of zt and estimated residuals of equation 1 as instruments.
∆ht = ahy(L)∆ht−1 +ahy(L)m f g.gd pt +ahn(L)∆npat + εht (3.9)
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The third equation is now given as
∆npat = ann(L)∆npat−1 +any(L)m f g.gd pt +anh(L)∆ht + εnt (3.10)
This equation is estimated using N lags of zt and estimated residuals of the previous two equa-
tion as instruments.
3.15.1 Results
Next we turn to a discussion of impulse response functions. We report the accumulated impulse
responses. Empirical evidence completely substantiates our first long run assumption. Manufac-
turing output rises and remains permanently higher following a permanent productivity shock.
Inclusion shocks and asset quality shocks affect output only over a small horizon in line with
our identifying assumption. This has been observed in all the countries surveyed. Similarly, per-
manent financial inclusion shocks raise credit to domestic sectors permanently and statistically
significantly. In the case of Philippines, both productivity shocks and permanent shocks to inclu-
sion lead to a permanent increase in credit. Productivity shocks explain 34.5 per cent and inclusion
explain 62 per cent of the variations in credit by Q4 (Appendix Table B.24).
Appendix Table B.25 presents the case of Armenia where productivity shocks reduce NPLs
permanently and significantly. Appendix Table B.26 shows the impulse responses for Malta where
inclusion shocks lead to a permanent decline in NPLs but it is not statistically significant from
zero. In the case of Brazil (Appendix Table B.28), productivity shocks explain a substantial per
centage of the variations in NPLs over a period of time with a significant downward impact. By
Q2, productivity shocks explain 41 per cent of the NPL variations and this share rises to 53 per
cent by the end of one year. In Thailand (Appendix Table B.30), NPLs exhibit zero response to
inclusion shocks until Q3 and rises after that, although not significantly.
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Appendix Table B.24 and B.29 presents the case of Philippines and Malaysia, respectively,
where inclusion shocks lead to a permanent and significant increase in NPLs. In Malaysia, inclu-
sion shocks explain 12 per cent of the variations in NPLs in the same quarter which attains a peak
of 14.4 per cent by Q3 and stays there permanently. In Philippines, inclusion shocks raise NPLs
and explain 20 per cent of the variation in NPLs by Q1 which rises to 21.7 per cent by Q4.
3.16 Conclusion
The paper develops a general equilibrium model to investigate how financial innovations in a
bank based financial inclusion system affects the credit cycle with implications for bank’s asset
quality. To motivate financial inclusion, the banking correspondent agents are modelled in two
alternative ways - one featuring BCAs as intermediaries between the bank and the household and
two, featuring BCAs as business facilitators or loan advisors and planners involved through the
lifecycle of the loan. The paper finds the model with BCAs as business facilitators scores over the
model where BCAs are only intermediaries involved in cash-in and cash-out transactions in terms
of its impact on financial stability and real variables. A rising cost of loan disbursal embedded in
increasing mark-up on charges of loan disbursing BCAs though raises interest rates spontaneously,
it has a limited impact on real variables. Instead, loans to households bounce back within a quarter,
aggregate consumption, deposits, asset prices and loans to firms continue to rise, while NPA ratio
declines. This is attributable to low default rates on loans which the BCAs ensure by managing
the loan closely with the households. This imbibes confidence among both the households and
banks about proper loan disbursal and recovery streamlining the credit cycle. In the first model, on
the other hand, default rates are determined by exogenous processes and the BCAs provide price
incentives to impatient households to recover the outstanding loan amount.
The paper also finds that a positive productivity shock to BCAs has a ’Leverage deluding’ and
an overall moderating impact on aggregate demand, while a technological shock has a ’leverage
inducing’ effect and tends to raise total borrowings, loan to value ratios, wages and consumption
and reduces default rates with an overall positive impact on aggregate demand.
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In terms of conventional shocks, monetary and macro-prudential policy tightening has the de-
sired impact on all real variables. However, monetary policy shock exhibits enhanced propagation
and most variables show higher persistence and hump shaped behaviour.
With respect to estimating the long run response of non-performing loans of banks to permanent
credit shock which is a measure of financial inclusion, the empirical exercise builds on the premise
that if financial inclusion is an integral part of credit policy in developing countries, credit and
non-performing loans might be responding, possibly with opposite signs, to permanent shocks
to inclusion, apart from cumulative productivity shocks in the long run. I test this hypothesis in
two separate empirical exercises (i) Testing for cointegration between credit, non-performing loans
and bank provisions, and (ii) VAR with long run restrictions using instrumental variables utilizing
datasets of 28 developing/emerging market economies spanning Asia, Africa,Latin America and
peripheral Europe. We particularly focus on those economies that have implemented bank based
financial inclusion measures.
Cointegration results confirm the existence of a common stochastic trend between credit, NPLs
and bank provisions in majority of the countries in the sample. NPLs are also found to decline
permanently and statistically significantly in response to one standard deviation shock to credit
in 14 countries. However, NPLs are also found to be rising significantly in 9 of the 24 countries
that exhibited a cointegrating relationship. In VAR with long run identifying restrictions, we find
that financial inclusion shocks have significantly and permanently raised credit to domestic sector
in most countries in the sample. However, we did not find statistically significant evidence that
non-performing loans decline in response to permanent inclusion shocks. Instead, the results of
Armenia and Brazil confirm that NPLs decline permanently in response to cumulative productivity
shocks and the response is statistically significant from zero. The only exception is the case of
Malta where inclusion shocks permanently depress NPLs, although the response is not statistically
significant. In some instances like Malaysia and Philippines, we also find evidence that NPLs have
significantly and permanently risen following financial inclusion shocks.
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Figure A.1: Dividend Volatility and Monetary policy
Figure A.2: Policies vs Welfare Losses
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Figure A.15: Asset Quality Shock
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Figure A.16: AB-Specification-1:Response to Provisions Shock
163
Figure A.17: AB-Specification-1:Response to Monetary Policy Shock
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Figure A.18: AB-Specification-2:Response to Provisions Shock
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Figure A.19: AB-Specification-2:Response to Monetary Policy Shock
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Table B.1: Difference in Difference
Estimates at Country Level - Part I







































Number of country_id 56 56
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Table B.2: Difference in Difference
Results - Country Level (Part 2)
Coef. Std.Err t P>|t| 95 per. CI
log.rgdp -0.065 0.085 -0.760 0.450 -0.233 0.104
log.rcredit -0.072 0.034 -2.080 0.039 -0.140 -0.004
fi 0.310 0.269 1.150 0.250 -0.221 0.841
pr_31
2 -0.231 0.407 -0.570 0.571 -1.036 0.574
3 0.657 0.428 1.540 0.127 -0.189 1.504
4 0.914 0.435 2.100 0.037 0.055 1.773
pr_32
2
3 -0.559 0.375 -1.490 0.138 -1.299 0.181
4 -0.314 0.297 -1.060 0.292 -0.901 0.272
pr_33
2 0.560 0.435 1.290 0.200 -0.299 1.420
3 0.130 0.345 0.380 0.706 -0.551 0.812
4 -0.294 0.284 -1.040 0.302 -0.855 0.267
div_1 0.158 0.081 1.950 0.053 -0.002 0.318
spread 0.008 0.021 0.360 0.720 -0.034 0.049
lerner index -1.943 0.615 -3.160 0.002 -3.157 -0.728
year
2001 -0.228 0.190 -1.200 0.231 -0.603 0.147
2002 -0.263 0.182 -1.450 0.150 -0.621 0.096
2003 -0.407 0.184 -2.210 0.029 -0.771 -0.043
2004 -0.505 0.186 -2.710 0.008 -0.873 -0.137
2005 -0.950 0.187 -5.090 0.000 -1.319 -0.581
2006 -1.157 0.192 -6.020 0.000 -1.536 -0.777
2007 -1.219 0.189 -6.450 0.000 -1.592 -0.846
2008 -1.191 0.189 -6.300 0.000 -1.564 -0.817
2009 -1.160 0.251 -4.620 0.000 -1.655 -0.664
2010 -1.138 0.207 -5.490 0.000 -1.547 -0.729
_cons 2.604 0.305 8.530 0.000 2.001 3.207
169
Table B.3: Difference in Difference
Estimates for NPAs - Bank Level (India)
































Number of bankn 71 71
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Table B.4: Results of Johanssen Cointegration Test
Country Hypothesis Eigenvalue Trace Statistic Max Eigenvalue
Angola None * 0.649 35.174* 24.093*
At most 1 0.293 11.080 7.980
At most 2 0.126 3.101 3.101
Armenia None * 0.538 42.045* 33.193*
At most 1 0.175 8.852 8.295
At most 2 0.013 0.557 0.557
Bosnia None * 0.537 41.659* 30.072*
At most 1 0.256 11.587 11.540
At most 2 0.001 0.046 0.046
Brazil None * 0.478 41.414* 28.624*
At most 1 0.214 12.790 10.574
At most 2 0.049 2.216 2.216
India None * 0.928 69.981* 55.285*
At most 1 0.473 14.696 13.442
At most 2 0.058 1.254 1.254
Kazakhstan None * 0.671 56.348* 36.719*
At most 1 0.382 19.629* 15.867*
At most 2 0.108 3.762 3.762
Kenya None * 0.462 37.813* 24.777*
At most 1 * 0.206 13.036 9.251
At most 2 0.090 3.785 3.785
Lithuania None * 0.600 47.289* 26.597*
At most 1 0.435 20.692* 16.565*
At most 2 0.133 4.127* 4.127*
Malaysia None * 0.548 46.039* 34.107*
At most 1 0.192 11.932 9.171
At most 2 0.062 2.761 2.761
Malta None * 0.552 46.287* 36.167*
At most 1 0.196 10.120 9.822
At most 2 0.007 0.298 0.298
Mauritius None * 0.561 34.380* 20.559
At most 1 * 0.357 13.821 11.032
At most 2 0.106 2.789 2.789
Nicaragua None * 0.463 34.248* 20.518
At most 1 0.243 13.729 9.202
At most 2 0.128 4.528 4.528
*’: indicate significance level at 5%
171
Table B.5: Results of Johanssen Cointegration Test (contd. . . )
Country Hypothesis Eigenvalue Trace Statistic Max Eigenvalue
Panama None * 0.455 38.813* 26.090*
At most 1 0.190 12.723 9.063
At most 2 0.082 3.660 3.660
Papua N.G None * 0.557 26.792 23.605*
At most 1 0.097 3.187 2.957
At most 2 0.008 0.230 0.230
Poland None * 0.600 37.235* 28.430*
At most 1 0.218 8.805 7.640
At most 2 0.037 1.165 1.165
Ukraine None * 0.446 41.748* 23.595
At most 1 0.260 18.153 12.064
At most 2 0.141 6.089 6.089
Uganda None * 0.619 61.090* 36.714*
At most 1 0.449 24.376* 22.674*
At most 2 * 0.044 1.702 1.702
Trinidad None * 0.837 70.515* 59.843*
At most 1 * 0.267 10.671 10.249
At most 2 0.013 0.422 0.422
South Africa None * 0.780 59.044* 46.976*
At most 1 * 0.302 12.068 11.140
At most 2 0.029 0.928 0.928
Turkey None * 0.291 26.378* 13.3886
At most 1 * 0.246 12.990* 11.00399
At most 2 0.050 1.986 1.986
Peru None * 0.860 66.407* 41.264*
At most 1 * 0.603 25.143* 19.376*
At most 2 0.240 5.767 5.767
Romania None * 0.611 42.958* 23.630*
At most 1 * 0.511 19.329* 17.888*
At most 2 0.056 1.441 1.441
Hungary None * 0.622 43.090* 27.265*
At most 1 * 0.328 15.825 11.122
At most 2 0.155 4.703 4.703
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Figure B.2: Categorical Variable used in Difference in Difference Estimation
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